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1. Introduction 
The African Union (AU) is a Union composed of most of the countries on the 
African continent, designed, in part, to unite and strengthen the position of 
these countries in the world (www.african-union.com). The AU is a new 
development of the nearly forty-year-old Organization of African Unity 
(OAU). Which was an organization widely accused of being a mere “dictators’ 
club” (Francis 2006:28).  The new organization, however, includes some rather 
significant changes as opposed to the former OAU1. One of the most 
significant amendments is the reorganization of the principle of non-
intervention to a principle of intervention under certain criteria. The African 
continent has a special history when it comes to state sovereignty. Since the 
early days of colonization there has been a rigid system of state sovereignty 
and non-intervention. The realignment of the sovereignty principle, therefore, 
marks as a substantial normative change in political thought. It is a change that 
has been done in concert with nearly all the African states. The construction of 
the Union has empowered the organization to cut across the sovereignty 
principle and take an interventionist stand. It opens up the possibility for the 
African Union to act as an autonomous actor and intervene into the domestic 
affairs of another member state without its consent. The joint resolution 
disembarks the longstanding notion that intervention is a cardinal sin in the 
interaction amongst the African states and, more importantly, it rattles the cage 
of absolute state sovereignty. A resolution like this is very much a part of 
making the African Union a super national organization rather then an 
international one. This thesis will, therefore, investigate the normative change 
of the principle of sovereignty within the context of the establishment of the 
African Union. It scrutinizes key factors that may have contributed to this 
                                                 
1 The union, for instance, is constructed over many of the same principles of the European Union (EU) (Francis 
2006:29). 
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decision being made and gazes into how and why state leaders would give up 
sovereignty. 
 
1.1 Research questions 
There are several issues that make the scope of this thesis complex, though the 
explanans only concerns one article of the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union. In order to investigate the decision making process one needs to 
identify the decision makers. It will also be necessary to look at what kind of 
political environment these decision makers were in at the time the decision 
was made. This is complex because the article in question is breaking with one 
of the most fundamental principles of how the African states has interacted 
with each other and the rest of the world and also how they have seen them 
selves since their independence. Further a theoretical perspective must be 
applied. This is also interesting because the article is challenging one of the 
most traditional ways for a state to claim autonomy: the principle of state 
sovereignty. It opens for the possibility of another state in concert with the 
organization, or the organization as an autonomous actor to intervene another 
state in Africa. In Africa, and in the world this Article is without precedent. 
The Article is called Article 4 (h):  
 “[T]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a 
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to 
legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the 
Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council;”(Article 4 
(h) in the Constitutive Act of the African Union) 
 
The thesis has two ambitions: One empirical and one theoretical. The empirical 
ambition is to understand how this decision came about. By investigating 
which factors that contributed to the agreement reached through Article 4 (h), I 
 9
seek to get a fuller picture of the political backdrop in the African states 
involved. Consequently, the thesis will look at the surroundings in which the 
most important decision makers found them selves at the time. Who were the 
initiators to this change in policy? What motivations did they have? In seeking 
answers to these questions, it is crucial to test the empirical data with some 
concept of what motivations states and state leaders, have when they make 
decisions in concert. Hence, the thesis needs to utilize a theoretical framework 
in order to get an understanding of how and why Article 4 (h) came about. 
 
The theoretical ambition is to find out how well this change in intervention 
politics can be accounted for in the framework of available international 
relations theory (IR theory). That sovereign states would agree to hand their 
exclusive right to self-governing and non-interference over to a continental 
organization sounds odd in the ears of many IR theorists. States are, in many 
theories, the solid unit of investigation. It is a unit that inhibits certain values 
and rights that it will maintain, regardless of changes in the world. The concept 
of sovereignty is one of such values. It defines a line between entities in the 
international system, and although non-governmental organizations are allowed 
to operate in between these lines, the lines gives meaning to the understanding 
of how states relate to one another and fits in to meaningful analysis of the state 
system. How well then do our I -theories explain how this decision could see 
the light of day? 
 
The research questions for this thesis will be: 
 
1:Why is the African Union, in article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act, breaking 
with its hard and fast line of non-intervention? 
 
2: To what extent can mainstream IR theories account for the policy change 
of article 4 (h) in the Constitutive Act of the African Union? 
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2. Research Method 
Both of the two research questions are in them selves ambitious and perhaps 
impossible to answer fully. The obvious reason for this is that there is an 
endless list of possibilities that could have affected the decision makers in the 
states to decide what they have decided. It would be impossible to take all these 
in to consideration. In much the same way, the theoretical ambition needs to be 
narrowed down. The limits of this thesis prevent it from analyzing every 
possible hypothesis from the vast pool of IR theories. It is therefore necessary 
to concretize how the thesis will embark on answering these questions.  
 
2.1 Research Design 
The research questions and the approach to investigate these questions suggest 
a case study design. Yin claims that a case study has a distinct advantage when 
“a “how” or “why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, 
over which the investigator has little or no control” (2003:9). This thesis is 
investigating the reasons why a political decision was made, but also how IR 
theory is equipped to account for the implications of this decision. It is thus 
posing both a “how” and a “why” question. This leads me to consider a case 
study to be the design that has the greatest potential to answer the research 
questions. Because the thesis consists of two research questions that present 
two different ambitions within the same case and with different units on 
different levels, this study falls within what is called an embedded single-case-
design (Yin 2003: 42). This design allows analysis of both the state leaders that 
were significant to the decision making process, but also the surroundings in 
which they found them selves in. This implies that the thesis aspire to test three 
well-formulated theories. As the thesis proceed it will hopefully reveal some of 
the background and circumstances of the main actors in the case and go on to 
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test the three different IR theories through analysis. This design should thus 
offer a chance to fulfill both ambitions of the thesis: To investigate and 
understand why the state leaders ratified article 4 (h), and to what extent IR 
theory can account for this outcome. 
 
2.2 Empirical Considerations 
The collection of data for this thesis was not without difficulties. The best way 
of determining which ones of the decision makers in the process that were 
significant in initiating the change would have been to read transcripts from the 
sessions in which they were discussed. This has however proved to be 
impossible for me to obtain. As the Ministerial Council at the Norwegian 
embassy in Addis Ababa wrote me: “Even if such information exist at the AU, 
which I doubt, it is not likely that you will be able to access it […] in my 
experience with the organization” (Rye 2006 [personal email]). This has 
rendered me with second-hand sources and news-statements. There has been 
written a great deal about different subjects surrounding the creation of the 
African Union. Many prominent writers and academics have done impressive 
and interesting observations and analysis on the subject. I have been forced to 
rely on their description of the reality I have set out to explore. This has both 
strengths and weaknesses. The obvious strength with basing the selection of 
data on previous research is that the likelihood of getting a good selection of 
the primary actors in the process is great. The “risk” of leaving out an 
important party because of the lack of funds or capabilities in other areas is 
divided amongst many, and I have been privileged enough to be able to gain 
from the work of others. The set of specifications for the population can thus be 
defined as 1) possibility of voting at the Head of State and Government 
Assemblies of the OAU, 2) being mentioned by more than two observers as 
one of the main actors in the creation of the AU (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
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Nachmias 1996:180). I consider my choice of main actors in this thesis to be 
founded on solid ground and to be as uncontroversial as possible.  
 
The weakness of course, is that through second-hand information I am not able 
to determine if there is any information that may have been useful to my 
objective that is not available to me. I have to trust that the image gathered 
from the different articles and books I have had access to is as complete as 
possible and gives me a valid ground to test my hypotheses on. I do however 
believe that this weakness is a minor one. As will be revealed in Chapter 5, my 
choice of empirics has had the benefit of being able to base it self somewhat on 
the analysis of others. The benefit of several concurring articles that describes 
the background and motives of some of the African State leaders for ratifying 
the Constitutional Act strengthens the reliability of the data selection (e.g. 
Tieku 2004). This has provided me with the opportunity to make the chapter on 
empirics briefer than otherwise. The intricate analyses of the background of the 
main actors as such is already provided elsewhere. The task has been to use the 
relevant information to fit my thesis.  
  
2.3 Methodological Considerations 
In a case study, such as this one, there are many potential problems that may 
arise if the researcher is not thorough and particular in what is being done and 
how it is being done. Many questions need to be asked in the outset of a 
research design in order to ensure that the design is consistent with the kind of 
research one wants to conduct. These questions concern such topics as validity, 
reliability and the possibility of generalization.  
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2.3.1 Validity 
My research questions ask both a “why” and a “how” question respectively. 
The empirical research question, number 1, is addressing the issue of why a 
change has occurred. The thesis will proceed to explain this change through as 
series of theoretical hypotheses. In this respect it is important to develop a 
sufficient set of operational measures (Yin 2003: 35). This thesis will employ 
three different theories to explain the policy change in question. Derived from 
these theories will be three different operational sets, that each contains the 
theory’s position on state sovereignty and the importance of this. As this is the 
policy change the thesis aim to explain, the operational sets of measurements 
should be complete and sufficient. This strengthens the confidence that the 
choice of theories and the operationalization that follows does not constitute a 
problem of validity. As described above the selection of data does not stem 
from a mere intuitive choice of who would be the main actors in this decision. 
As the thesis will demonstrate as it proceeds, the selection of the main actors, 
and also on what aspects of their background that has been included, is a result 
of what various and several researchers have done prior to this thesis. Though 
there is an endless pool of possible data that could be included in the thesis, the 
format demands that some limitations must be made. Based on the selection of 
these academics, but also on the data that has been presented through this 
selection, the data should prove sufficient for an analysis of this kind. 
 
The concern of generalization from case studies has been widely debated (Yin 
2003:37). The question of whether it is possible to say something general based 
on the findings of just one case is not easily answered. In the case of this thesis 
the ambition of generalization is limited to the testing of the theories. As such it 
will be an analytical generalization (ibid). The first research question seeks to 
explain why the policy change was made, but does not seek to find any 
universal or general laws that may be applicable to other cases. The second 
research question however, means to investigate if any such regularity already 
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has been accounted for in any of the three theories that are being tested. 
Though both questions are being answered through the same thesis, by the 
same tools, the different questions poses different aspects and also different 
ambitions, as has already been emphasized. However it is important to state 
that the test for external validity lays in the potential for the second research 
question to challenge, test and strengthen/weaken well-formulated IR theories. 
2.3.2 Reliability 
“The goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and biases in a study” 
(Yin2003: 37). In this thesis I have strived consistently throughout the process 
to select theories that are respected and well founded in the academic literature. 
This has been a conscious choice in order to use theories that are not just easy 
to recover, but that should also be familiar to most political scientists. In this 
manner I believe that I have created a possibility for readers of this thesis to 
easily follow my arguments and analysis and thus be able to arrive at the same 
conclusions as my findings. The data collection has been characterized by lack 
of available first hand information. This has left me with the option of relying 
on the findings of others. To compensate for this I have chosen to trust 
academic literature and where available supplemented the information with 
news stories or other documentation. As a result, the chapters describing the 
contemporary events are all relying on two or more sources. Fortunately for 
this thesis the empirical background for the creation of the African Union is 
thoroughly described and analyzed in academic literature. I feel confident in 
the selection of main actors and the additional information on this case that has 
been provided by academic literature.  
2.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The first chapter has already provided an introduction to the thesis and to the 
research questions that will be investigated throughout the thesis. It has also 
 15
given an explanation to why these questions should be answered and why they 
deserve attention academically. Chapter 2 is dedicated to describe the research 
design, what kind of research that will be conducted and the methodological 
problems and considerations that needs to be addressed in this respect. 
 
Chapter 3 will then proceed to describe the historical context to the thesis. It 
should provide the reader with a sufficient insight to the African state building 
and consolidation and also with an understanding of the position state 
sovereignty has had on the African continent. There will also be a discussion of 
what the article in question (Article 4 (h) in the Constitutive Act) actually 
entails, but without any prophetic ambitions as to how it will affect the 
interstate politics.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework for the thesis. In this chapter a 
brief introduction to the three well-founded IR-theories realism, liberal 
institutionalism and constructivism, will lead to a hypothesis for each. For each 
hypothesis an operational set is listed to define what findings that need to be 
identified to strengthen the explanation of each. With these criterions in place 
the hypotheses are ready for testing and it is timely to present the actual case on 
which they will be tested. 
 
Chapter 5 will then go through the case. This chapter is structured such that 
three state leaders will be presented as the main actors of the decisional 
process. The outset from where they each made their initiatives in relation to 
the decision is presented one by one. After these three presentations follows a 
section that is concerned with the surrounding political environment. This 
section focuses on the world rather then just the immediate proximity of the 
actors, but is mainly concerned with the political actions and ratifications that 
concern state sovereignty prior to the decision in question. 
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Chapter 6 is concerned with how much explanation force each hypothesis has 
to the decision, when considering the information provided in chapter 5, and 
also conscious to the information from chapter 3. The chapter is structured to 
best handle the listed criterion to the hypotheses. As the theories offer different 
perspectives of how the world can best be explained, the different sections vary 
somewhat in structure, but are all designed to best fulfill its purpose. I shall go 
through each of the listed criteria in such a way that it becomes possible to see 
whether the hypotheses have reason to be strengthened or weakened. This will 
in turn reveal which one of the theories best explains the decision at best, or at 
least show which ones are the least plausible explanations. Through this 
process I hope to shed some light and new perspective on a political act that is 
both little debated intellectually and also unprecedented in African history and, 
at the time of the birth of this article, in political history in general. 
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3. History/ Background 
To better understand why the research question and more importantly the 
significance of the change in intervention policy, it is important to give a brief 
description of how the African state system has been up until this decision. 
This chapter will therefore first briefly discuss the Westphalian state system in 
order to allow for a better understanding of what this term actually means. The 
focus then moves on to describe how African politics were in general terms up 
until the process of colonization. It will briefly touch on how the colonial 
powers defined the states and decided on the borders. Even though this 
constitutes a major impact on the premises of this thesis the process of this 
decision will prove to be less significant. However, the great variation in 
political culture between pre-colonial Africa and the colonial powers will also 
give a possibility to get some perspective on why it could have been important 
for the new African state leaders after the liberation to keep the borders of 
colonial times. Finally, the change that the new article constitutes is discussed 
briefly. The shift from a rigid regime of non-intervention has been formally 
ratified, and to understand what the thesis is concerned with, it is important to 
state what this change consists of. The discussion will mention some of the 
aspects of the article and touch on what implications this might have on inter-
state politics on the African continent. In sum, the chapter should give a sound 
historical background on what the thesis analysis is concerned with. 
3.1 The Westphalian State 
  
“From the perspective of any 
particular state what it chiefly hopes 
to gain from participation in the 
society of states is recognition of its 
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independence of outside authority, 
and in particular of its supreme 
jurisdiction over its subjects and 
territory” (Bull 1977: 17) 
 
In today’s world, every state could more or less be said to be a part of what 
Bull defines as an international society. This implies recognizing certain 
common interests and values. They feel bound to some set of rules in their 
interaction with each other, such as the right of independence and an obligation 
to honor agreements that are made and that they should be subject to certain 
limitations in exercising force against one an other (Bull 1977: 13). At the 
same time they cooperate in institutions and abide to the conventions of war 
and the process of diplomacy (Ibid.). Within this definition comes the concept 
of sovereignty. Even though sovereignty as a concept of individual states was 
established, some of the principles like the right of non-intervention, equality 
of states in respect of their basic rights, and the rights of states to domestic 
jurisdiction were worked out by the theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century (Bull 1977: 35). Nevertheless, these concepts are the ones that is 
commonly associated with the modern state system and often referred to as the 
Whestphalian state system (Dunn & Shaw 2001: 13).  
 
Bøås and Dokken (2002:12) give a short introduction to the Westphalian state 
system and the post-colonial African state: The nation-state as a sovereign 
authority over a certain territory is often associated with the peace agreement in 
the Westphalia in 1648. What distinguishes this state model from other models 
are, first and foremost the significant division between economic institutions in 
the private sector and the political institutions in the public sector. In the 
modern Westphalian state the sovereignty is more than a juridical brand. 
Sovereignty is real and substantial in the sense that the state governs 
autonomous, and that it has an economic base of resources and an ability to 
defend it self. Furthermore it is a prerequisite that the state has monopoly on 
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coercion and means of enforcement, but that the military power is directed 
outwards against external threats, and not inwards. Law and order is presumed 
to be upheld by the publics support to the governing organs and the bills and 
rules these impose. One last criterion that is usually associated with the 
Westphalian state system is the national state (Ibid.). This implies that one or 
more groups inside the state relate to the state in the sense that there is 
something that distinguishes them from others outside the state. This can often 
be an understanding that stems from ethnic or cultural inheritance.  
 
The governing of such states has been seen as personal government. It has been 
said that states of this kind has a vague division of the public and the private 
sphere, or that it has a “politics of the belly”, meaning that the political praxis 
mostly is executed to ensure ones own wellbeing (Ibid). It is, regardless of how 
one defines it, commonly accepted amongst Africa-researchers that this type of 
state functions between a legal, bureaucracy-rational framework and a person-
based framework (Ibid.). In most cases the separation between office and 
person or politics and economy is only real on paper. The result of this is that 
political position requires position in the financial life, and vice versa. This 
does create a different social arrangement than the one we find in the 
Westphalian nation-state. This logic is exactly what has created a state that is 
weak and strong at the same time: The state is weak, but the government and 
leaders are amazingly stabile (ibid: 13). 
3.2 States and Power in Africa 
The African state system is, and has been, very different from the “western” 
type of state systems. One of the most important reasons for this may be the 
way the states are constituted, which differs substantially from the way the 
“western” states were built. In Africa the issue was never scarcity of land, like 
for instance in Europe (Herbst 2000: 13). The challenges of a state leader in 
African states before the colonial period, was governing the people, rather than 
 20
governing a limited area of land. “The fundamental problem facing state-
builders in Africa – be they pre-colonial kings, colonial governors, or 
presidents from the independent era – has been to project authority over 
inhospitable territories that contain relative low densities of people”(Ibid: 11). 
The need for borders was therefore mainly to protect the people inside them, 
not to mark the end of one leaders reign. There were states, and political 
culture, but it was not built on the same structures and rules as the ones we 
know from Europe (Ibid: 37). The mere criteria for consolidating power was 
different, inter alia because there was no need to occupy more land in order to 
enhance ones power; it was how many people that were in your tribe or 
kingdom2(Ibid: 55). The cost of expanding was simply too high compared to 
the gain of it (Ibid: 56). And protecting borders was only necessary all the 
while there were people within them. There was rarely any need to protect 
territory as such, for the mere purpose of keeping land. Thus, prior to the 
colonies there was really no substantial state-building in Africa that could be 
compared to the European model (Ibid: 37) When the Europeans colonized the 
continent they developed a need to divide it between them (Ibid: 66). This was 
done, as is commonly known, not to govern the territory most efficient or to 
cooperate with the indigenous population, but to avoid further conflict between 
the occupying forces3. The Berlin Conference of 1884/5 is one of the reasons 
why many of the state borders in Africa look like they do. In fact as much as 
44% of the borders today are correlating with astrological lines or are parallels 
to some other set of lines (Ibid: 75). 
 
                                                 
2 There were exceptions to this, like the emperor Haile Salaisse who named his son Asfa-Wasen (Amharic for 
”expand the frontiers”) (Herbst 2000: 35). 
3 The Berlin Conference of 1884/5 regulated the European colonization and trade in Africa and is often seen as the 
formalization of the “Scramble for Africa”. (Herbst 2000: 71) 
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3.3 State politics in pre-colonial Africa 
“Pre-colonial African states had precisely the opposite physiology of many in 
Europe: [T]he power of assets was concentrated in the centre with gradations to 
the hinterland. The European model of placing significant assets in the 
hinterland to protect against outsiders and to make the boundaries real was 
neither viable nor relevant” (Herbst 2000: 57). As stated above, costs of 
extending power over inhospitable areas with relative low densities of people 
has confined this type of politics on the pre-colonial African leaders. Herbst 
(2000:13) argues that leaders confront three sets of issues when building their 
states: the cost of expanding the domestic power infrastructure; the nature of 
national boundaries; and the design of state systems. In Europe, from the start 
of the fifteenth century, the population density had increased in such a way that 
states were beginning to fight over land to expand them selves and make room 
for their population. The scarcity for land made the state politics very different 
in Europe than in Africa, much because the need to centralize power, raise 
taxes, recruit new soldiers and fiercely controlling the states hinterland became 
an absolute criteria for existence. The struggle for the survival of the state was 
formed by the increasing density of the population (Ibid.). The state building 
was thus formed after the need for protection and expansion; the states became 
warrior states. These principles of necessity that created the European states are 
not applicable to describe the African state building, nor the politics between 
African state leaders. Because determining factors such as scarcity of land and 
population growth were vastly different, there were not any contesters over bits 
of land (Ibid: 39). The consequence of this was that the power of the state and 
its independence was not dependent on controlling the hinterland of the state. It 
was, of course necessary to reach the frontiers and it was necessary to execute 
power, but there were rarely any plans or need for expansion or developing of 
roads or any other means for reaching the hinterland faster or more efficient 
(Ibid: 28). The cost of extending the power was often much higher than the 
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benefit, since the need was not present. For that reason there were not many 
roads to the outer skirts of a kingdom in Africa (Ibid: 56).  
 
3.4 Colonisation and State Consolidation 
When the Europeans colonized the Continent, they divided the land, as already 
stated, for practical purposes and to ensure the peace between them. Many of 
the dividing lines were in unexplored parts of the continent. Some in what was 
already scarcely populated land, and some dividing tribes or old kingdoms 
(Dunn & Shaw 2001: 15). The colonists ruled with the principles of respecting 
these borders, as was natural since they were artificially created for this exact 
purpose (Ibid/Herbst 2000: 71). When they then left the continent, the question 
of what was to become of the old colonies and what one was to do about the 
separating borders that divided the continent, in what now had to be seen as 
arbitrary lines arose. The decision to maintain the borders and emphasize the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention may have been a practical way 
of avoiding mayhem and anarchy on the continent (Bøås & Dokken 2002: 78).  
 
The new leaders of the liberated African states, realizing that they lacked the 
capacity to govern their states in their full extension, and even more so the 
capacity to protect their borders against potential aggressors, agreed on these 
principles in order to maintain balance and stability on the continent (Ibid.). 
They formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) where the official 
purpose was to promote unity and solidarity between the member states. The 
organization was constructed around the principles of state sovereignty and nn-
intervention to achieve this purpose (Ibid: 80). This development did in part 
secure some stability on the continent, save for power struggles and civil wars 
within the countries, and many of the problems Africa is facing today is related 
to this state structure (Ibid: 78). The principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention were upheld, and thus wars between countries were not the 
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problem it might have been. This is not of course to say that everything was in 
perfect order. It was not. 
 
Consolidating state power by maintaining artificially made borders in Africa 
has disregarded nationality and ethnicity within those borders (Dunn & Shaw 
2001: 15). “Specifically, the departing colonial powers selected a group of 
post-colonial African leaders drawn from upper elites who had more in 
common with their former colonial masters than the people they would govern” 
(Ibid.). The OAU has been referred to as a “dictators club”, and the agreement 
of non-intervention has seemed to function as a cushion for the dictators by 
giving them the space they need to execute the power they want, by any means 
they see fit (BBC 2002).  
 
On the other hand these principles might have been the lesser of two evils at 
the time they were chosen. As Clapham (1996: 35) notes, “[b]oth models of 
administration and languages of rule followed the colonial pattern. There was, 
in short, no alternative”. It might be that the decision to keep the borders of the 
colonial powers and thus enforcing the principle of non-intervention as a 
securing means was the safest way of keeping stability on the continent as 
previously noted (Bøås & Dokken 2002: 78). But as Bøås and Dokken suggest, 
this should perhaps not be seen as a conscious collective decision, but rather as 
an implicit agreement not to voice the pan-African ideas too loud (Ibid.).  
 
3.5 The apostasy of sovereignty? 
Article 4 (h), as it was originally written in the Constitutive Act stated that the 
AU had the “right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
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Assembly4 in respect of grave circumstances, namely; war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity.” Though human rights violations are not 
mentioned and the article has a passive rather than an active mandate to the 
Union; it has a right, not a duty, article 4 (h) constituted a major change against 
the former practice of the OAU. That the Assembly could decide to intervene 
autonomously gave the AU an authority it’s predecessor the OAU has never 
had. It became an independent actor on a whole new level, and it had political 
measures unprecedented in the history of pan-African politics. This meant that 
Africa had a theoretical possibility of never seeing another tragedy like the 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994 that “demonstrated the virtual impotence of the 
OAU in the face of violent conflict within its member states”(Murithi 2008: 
72). The AU act is the first international treaty to recognize the right to 
intervene for a humanitarian purpose (Humanitarian intervention) (Baimu & 
Sturman 2003:40). These points make it easy to understand, from a 
humanitarian and from a peace promoting view why the AU would adapt this 
principle. It had been demonstrated in the past that the rigid non-intervention 
policy of the OAU, though well intended, was one of the principles that 
crippled the organizations ability to act (Murithi 2008: 72).  
 
Nevertheless, a state leader that agrees to these terms surrenders sovereignty on 
some level. If the AU is granted the right to intervene without the consent of a 
member state, tough dependent on the Assembly, the state has effectively given 
up the right to defend it self from at least some exterior factors. Even though 
the criteria under which the resolution is bound are meant to help the people of 
the state, it is the state leader, and thus the government that has to consent to 
the resolution. Regardless of how a state is organized, it be democracy or 
autocracy, this seem like abandoning power. And so came the amendments. 
 
                                                 
4 ”Assembly” means the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Union. The Assembly is composed of 
the Heads of States and Government or their duly accredited representatives and is the supreme organ of the 
Union. 
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At the Heads of State and Government of the AU’s first extraordinary session 
on 3 February 2003 Libya, especially, proposed a number of amendments, 
many to make the AU stronger and to unite the continent further. This was all 
in the spirit of the earlier proposal by Libya of the United States of Africa 
(Baimu & Sturman 2003: 38). The most important one in this context is the 
amendment to Article 4 (h). This amendment, which was adapted at the 
session, extended the AU’s rights of intervention. The right was extended to 
include “serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the 
Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and 
Security Council;” as a criteria for intervention. As Baimu and Sturman (2003: 
42) points out this last ground for intervention has little to do with the former 
ones. The original grounds for intervention – war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide – are all designated in the Rome statute as crimes of 
“greatest concern to the international community” (Ibid.). Furthermore they are 
all grounds that are on accord with the Declaration of Human Rights and thus 
designed to protect people from some gruesome and coercive force. This new 
ground seems to be a shift in “emphasis of the grounds of the AU’s ground to 
intervene, from humanitarian justification to the rationale of preserving 
“order””(Baimu & Sturman 2004: 38). The fact that the proposal came from 
Libya’s leader Ghaddafi and that the advancement of human rights, democracy 
and good governance was “the antithesis of how [he] had ruled his country for 
the last three decades”, induces the idea that the new emphasis was intended to 
serve the government rather than the people in the states (Ibid.)  
 
Of course these are not necessarily mutually exclusive intentions. It is possible 
to restore legitimate order with the people’s best interest in mind. It may, as 
Baimu and Sturman (2003: 41) again point out, rest upon how “legitimate 
order” is defined. In their analysis Baimu and Sturman (Ibid) assume that a 
“legitimate order can only result from a free and fair election”, based on an 
OAU definition. However, a fair and free election is not an uncontested term. 
African states, African regional organizations (e.g. The Southern African 
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Development Community (SADC)), international NGOs and the international 
community differ in their conception of this principle. The Zimbabwean 
presidential election of 2002 is one example where there have been different 
opinions of the legitimacy of the election. Baimu and Sturman (2003:41) notes 
that “ OAU and SADC observers as well as observers from African countries 
such as South Africa and Tanzania were prepared to conclude that even if they 
were not free and fair they were at least legitimate” in regards to the 
Zimbabwean election (2002). This uncertainty of what constitutes legitimate 
order does shake the motivations for the grounds of intervention. It might 
suddenly seem as though the amendment is creating a loophole for the AU’s 
first attempt to an article to actually protect the people of Africa, after more 
than 40 years of protecting the governments. Not only are the intentions 
questionable, but also the amendment seems to be passed out of pragmatic and 
political reasons, thus abandoning ideology completely. If keeping Libya 
onboard was so important that one could abandon one of the principles that are 
truly contrasting the AU from the OAU, then the article might almost seem 
unnecessary. While the original Article 4 (h) looked to be the remedy for 
OAU’s impotence in disputes in their member states, the amendment could in 
fact put this impotence right back. Even though the AU now has the right to 
intervene, it could be possible for the government to dismiss whatever problem 
would cause the AU to intervene as a “serious threat to legitimate order”. In 
which case the intervention could be toothless with regard to the people in the 
state. Though this thesis will not discuss the actual effects of the constitutional 
act, it is interesting to note in such a radical ratification as Article 4 (h). The 
theoretical possibility of an autonomous intervention from the AU remains 
however. The change stands and history has changed.  
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has given a brief historical introduction to the African history of 
state building and sovereignty. It has been important to emphasize that the 
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African relationship to the sovereign state and the Westphalian state system is 
widely different from the European. The indigenous political culture of the pre-
colonial African nations were not concerned with the same state-building 
mechanisms as the Europeans that came and sought domination. The reasons 
for this was, inter alias that the variables over how one consolidates power was 
different in Africa than it was in Europe. The population density was lower; the 
landscape in parts less hospitable and the land was vastly greater. “[W]hereas 
European states defined them selves and fixed their boundaries in competition 
with neighboring states much like themselves, African ones formed islands of 
relatively settled government. […] Dissidents or defeated groups could strike 
out into the borderlands to conquer or establish kingdoms of their own” 
(Clapham 1996: 29). Such differences made the clash of European imposition a 
heritage that proved difficult to avoid. The African states that map the 
continent today has not progressed “naturally” and is thus inhibited by this. The 
Westhalian state system has been adopted after the independence of the African 
states to maintain government in the states, but has been upheld in disregard to 
cultural, national and socio-economic variables that dates back in time before 
the colonization. This principle has crippled the continental organization, the 
OAU, that was created to promote unity and solidarity between the member 
states, and rendered instead a rigid principle of non-intervention that made 
member states and others horrified spectators to atrocities occurring within 
“sovereign borders”. When the successor, the African Union (AU), now has 
created Article 4 (h) that permits the AU to intervene under certain 
circumstances, it is important to note that the amendments that were ratified 
soon after does in part contradict the original intention of the article. Though 
not opting to engage in a legal analysis, the thesis would be incomplete without 
a comment to this event.  
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4. Theory 
Dunn and Shaw (2001) claim that traditional IR theory is not applicable to the 
African continent. The reasons they present for this is both reasonable and 
plausible. For example there is the claim that IR theory, being developed solely 
by ‘western’ theorists, by whom they mean Western Europeans and Northern 
Americans, and discussed almost exclusively on or through situations 
regarding these counties and areas (Bøås & Dokken 2002:36). The argument is 
that these theories do not encapsulate the major historical differences between 
these two very different areas of the world (Dunn & Shaw 2001:4). One 
obvious difference is the nation-state building, and the different conditions and 
political traditions and culture that played out in these areas (Bøås & Dokken 
2002:36). On the African continent, it is argued, there was no real development 
in state building that could measure up to the European state model until the 
colonist period began (Herbst 2000:37). This is not to say that the African 
people was not living in a political environment, but the need to build and 
protect state frontiers were not present in the same way it was in Europe at the 
time before and during the process of the Westphalian peace treaty (Clapham 
1996: 29).  
 
Some argues that political atmosphere that exist on the African continent today 
is artificially developed and does not represent the political culture that was 
developing in Africa before it was interrupted, so to speak (Dunn & Shaw 
2001: 14). What this means is that Africa’s challenge to IR theory is quite 
simply that what is commonly assumed to be actors in international relations 
cannot be viewed as actors in the same way as with the so called western states 
that are for the most part constructed through war, nationalism and diplomacy. 
The African states on the other hand were, mostly, constructed to avoid just 
that, but between the colonial powers, not the indigenous people on the 
continent. This makes the African states different as they are not necessarily 
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nations, and thus not necessarily eager to maintain the state (Clapham 1996: 9-
10). If we accept this, then there is really no real reason to allow the states to be 
the actors that represent the people in them. The African state has yet to reach 
maturity and in that respect state-centric theories may not be well suited (Dunn 
& Shaw 2001: 27). 
 
4.1 Choosing the right approach 
This thesis will analyze an introduction of a new policy to the African 
continent that is contradictory to the earlier practice. This policy is 
implemented through the Constitutive Act of the AU. The states are the 
primary actors in this union. They are represented trough their leaders, 
although these are not always elected by the people, they are meant to represent 
the people. Being the head of the organ that has monopoly on power, the 
leaders are in a way representing the fate of the people of their state, if not their 
will, at the lest in the relationship to the AU.  Because the AU relies on the 
states as actors I feel that the problem of using traditional IR theory is reduced, 
as the thesis is not directly addressing the state-nation relationship.  
 
As the authors of ‘Africa’s Challenge to IR Theory’ challenge the only IR 
theory available, they render little to work with. The analyzing process will be 
difficult not only to accomplish in it self, but also to get acknowledgement for 
its validity without such theory. There is also the question whether or not Dunn 
and Shaw’s criticism is correct. Though their theoretical reasoning is logically 
valid it does have some premises that can be contested. One is that they do not 
acknowledge that the so-called “traditional IR theory” is made from a desire of 
generalizing so that political behavior can be compared athwart cultural 
differences. This thesis will investigate a political decision that has been made 
by state leaders in their capacity as actors. Though internal differences may 
cause a different perception of nationality within a state that does not remove 
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the possibility to treat the state as a state. This should permit this thesis to 
employ IR-theory to this case study. Furthermore, the issue of developing new 
theories for African politics would make any political analysis of this kind of 
subject delayed until such were developed. To say that no analysis of African 
politics is possible with today’s tools is a bold, but not an uncontestable 
statement. As the thesis focuses on the states and their leaders decisions, it will 
not be as much concerned with cultural and ethnic differences internally in the 
state. Thus the critique issued should not be as relevant to this case study as it 
would be to other attempts to understand African politics.  
 
To give an understanding as broad and deep as possible I believe that it is 
important to investigate the issue at hand from more than one perspective. 
There could, and probably will be, more than one reason for the change in 
politics by the union. The objective of this thesis is not to investigate if there 
has been a change, but why there has been a change. That there has actually 
been a change is documented by the empirics presented both in the introduction 
and in the background chapter of the thesis and is an historical fact. The 
challenge then is to seek what theory is best suited to analyze that fact. 
 
When dealing with an International Organization (IO) there is a vast pool of 
different theories from where to pick analytical tools. As it has been aptly put: 
“[W]hen we choose a theoretical framework, we should choose one whose 
assumptions approximate the empirical conditions of the IO we are analyzing, 
and […] we should be aware of the biases created by these assumptions” 
(Barnett et al.1999:704). With that in mind one needs to assess what options 
are available as tools to solve the inquiry.  
 
 
 
The thesis will investigate the creation of Article 4 (h) from the notion that the 
main actors are states. The primary objects of analysis will be the actions of the 
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states. The theories that seem to be most eligible to explain this are three 
dominant perspectives within international relations, namely realism, 
institutionalism and constructivism (Dokken & Bøås 2002: 39). There are 
critics of such theories as neorealism and liberal institutionalism that argue that 
these theories do not look at what IOs do (Bauer 2004:7). The feature these 
have in common is that their ontological view does not permit them to address 
intergovernmental organizations as actors “[…] because ontologically, they are 
theories about states” (Bauer 2004:8). However, as mentioned earlier, the 
actors of both the AU and the former OAU are the states through their 
respective leaders. Through the meetings of the OAU the states have in fact 
established a new organization in the AU. As the states are the principals in the 
organization and they indeed are the ones this resolution will affect, this might 
be a good focal point for analysis. Indeed: If the states are allowed the 
responsibility of creating the AU and consequently Article 4 (h) in the 
Constitutive Act, then it would seem that we are approaching a sensible angle 
from where to ask our why: 
 
In order to make a meaningful analysis of the case presented by the thesis it is 
important to determine what we can expect to find from the tools we are using. 
It is necessary to specify what we can call evidence of the sort of behavior that 
the hypothesis describe. To do this I will list criteria to the hypothesis of each 
theory. What should be found in the case in order for a theory to be considered 
a valid explanation? 
  
4.2 Realism 
This theory presents some very interesting aspects to my thesis. That realist 
seem to have no faith in institutions but still claim to be able to explain their 
existence through the considerations of the states leaves us with a state centric 
point of view. A presumption in the theory that the only actors in the 
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international society are the states leaves no decisional power for any IO. When 
an article in the Constitutional Act claims the right of autonomous intervention; 
that breaks with the constitutional principals of this theoretical framework. To 
ratify this for any state would be unthinkable. Yet, as mentioned above, that is 
what happened. The realist claim to be able to explain international politics 
implies that there is a solution for this. A presentation of the theory will reveal 
how realists expect states to act and under which circumstances they accept 
cooperation between them.  
 
Realism has five assumptions about the international system. The first one is 
that the international system is anarchic. This simply means that independent 
political units without any central authority comprise the international system. 
States are the major actors in world affairs (Grieco 1988: 488).  It does not 
mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder. It means that because there is no 
“government over governments”, sovereignty inheres in states (Mearsheimer 
1995: 10).  
The second assumption is that “states inherently possess some offensive 
military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly 
destroy each other” (Mearsheimer 1995:10). States are potentially dangerous to 
each other and consequently the international environment will punish states 
that fail to protect their vital interests or pursue objectives beyond their 
capabilities. Hence states are “sensitive to costs” and behave as unitary –
rational actors (Grieco 1988:488). 
The third assumption is that “international anarchy is the principal force 
shaping the motives and actions of states” (Ibid). Thus states can never be 
certain of other states intentions. (Mearsheimer 1995:10). 
The forth assumption is that the most basic motive driving states is survival 
(Mearsheimer 1995:10). States “are preoccupied with power and security, are 
predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to cooperate even 
in the face of common interests (Grieco 1988:488). 
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The fifth assumption is that states are instrumentally rational (Mearsheimer 
1995:10). This means that they think strategically as to how they behave in the 
international system.  
These five assumptions, put together, can create incentives for states to think 
and sometimes behave aggressively, even though none of the assumptions 
alone suggest that states should behave competitively (Ibid). 
According to Mearsheimer, three main patterns of behavior result from the 
combination of these assumptions.  
1. States in the international system fear each other (Ibid:11). In a world 
where all states have some capability to offend against another, all states 
must be at least suspicious to other states and whether they have reasons 
to be aggressive. Because states main concern is survival, security 
becomes vital. The assumption that there is no central authority in the 
international system makes the security issue crucial. “The possible 
consequences of falling victim to an aggression […] illustrate why fear 
is a potent force in world politics. […] The horrible consequences of 
war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, 
but as deadly enemies” (Ibid).  
2. Each state in the international system aims to guarantee its own survival 
(Ibid). Because there is no higher authority and other states must be seen 
as potential threats, states tend to feel alone and vulnerable. (Ibid). 
Alliances may occur, but these are only temporary marriages of 
convenience, and might easily break as states operate in a self-help 
system and should always be selfish (Ibid). This is true in the short term 
as well as the long term, because if a state loses in the short term, it 
might not be around for later (Ibid). 
3. “[S]tates in the international system aim to maximize their relative 
power positions over other states” (Ibid). This is simply because the 
more power you have over other states or in relation to other states, the 
less you have to fear from them. “This logic creates strong incentives for 
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states to take advantage of one another, including going to war if the 
circumstances are right and victory seems likely” (Ibid:12). The ultimate 
goal of course is to become the only hegemon in the system, completely 
out scaling all other states.  
All states are influenced by this logic, which leads to a world in a constant 
security competition. States are thusly both offensively and defensively 
oriented as they both seek to take advantage over other states and also are on 
the lookout not to be taken advantage over (Ibid).  
 
4.2.1 Cooperation in a Realist World 
Even when states share common goals, anarchy fosters competition and 
conflict, and this inhibits cooperation between them (Grieco1988:485). In spite 
of the logic of security competition and uncertainty of what other states might 
think or do, cooperation is not entirely impossible and does occur 
(Mearsheimer1995:12). It is however, sometimes difficult to achieve and 
always difficult to sustain. The reason for this, according to realism, is that two 
factors inhibit cooperation: relative-gains considerations5 and concern about 
cheating (Ibid). Realists find that states are positional and will thus not only 
worry about what they get out of a cooperative arrangement, but also whether 
or not the other parties will get more than they do. Because states in a realist 
world is concerned with the balance of power, they will always be concerned 
with how much assets the other states have and how they might become 
increasingly threatening. “…[C]ooperation among states has its limits, mainly 
because it is constrained by the dominating logic of security competition, 
which no amount of cooperation can eliminate (Ibid:10).” This thoroughly 
complicates cooperation between states. Even though a state is satisfied with a 
                                                 
5 One differs between absolute gains and relative gains. With absolute gains the parts are concerned about what 
they get for themselves and do not care if the other party gets more or less than them selves. With relative gains, 
however, the main concern is who gets more in comparison to the other. For a discussion on Absolute-/relative-
gains see Robert Powell (1999: 1303-1320). 
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partner’s compliance in a joint arrangement, it might nevertheless exit from it if 
the partner is achieving greater relative gains (Grieco1988:487).  As 
Mearsheimer puts it: “… [S]tates concerned about absolute gains need only 
make sure that the pie is expanding and that they are getting at least some 
portion of the increase, while states that worry about relative gains must care 
also about how the pie is divided, which complicate cooperation efforts” 
(Mearsheimer1995:13). The same insecurity makes concerns about cheating a 
major obstacle for cooperation. Especially in the military realm is this acute as 
a military advantage dramatically can change the balance of power (Ibid).  
4.2.2 Institutions in a Realist World 
Although realists hold that “international institutions affect the prospects for 
cooperation only marginally” (Grieco 1988:488), they do recognize that states 
sometimes operate through institutions (Mearsheimer 1995:13). However they 
believe that these simply are constructed based on states calculations of self-
interest in the international balance of power (Ibid). In other words they believe 
that states will construct or join in a cooperative initiative only if it suits its 
self-interest at the time. This does not mean that a state has to agree with 
everything the institution is campaigning, but finds that it is a more risky 
proposition to remain outside the institution and thus joins the institution 
enthusiastically. “In short, the balance of power is the independent variable that 
explains war; institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process” 
(Ibid).  
4.2.3 Realism applied on the case 
According to the abovementioned principles, if realism has the most valid 
explanation we should expect to find evidence of motives that gains the major 
actors in the case. Since realism is based on the assumption that all states are 
unitary rational actors, we should expect to find some evidence of this. We 
should also expect to see that the patterns of behavior described above dictates 
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the behavior of the main actors to some extent. As realists believe that states 
never surrender decisional power to organizations the hypothesis of how this 
article came about from a realist point of view must be:  
 
H1: Article 4 (h) was adapted to accommodate the main actors goals, but 
will not be upheld at the expense of their interests. 
 
In this case one should expect to find some evidence of some self-enhancing 
motivation with the main actors, moreover that the state leaders are explicitly 
promoting states interests and that the states act according to the three patterns 
of behavior mentioned to seek power, security and wealth. These are the 
criterions that should be met in order to strengthen this hypothesis. 
 
 
4.3 Liberal Institutionalism 
Liberal Institutionalism argues that although states are the decision makers in 
the international society, and though they are in fact egoistic rational actors in 
an anarchic world, cooperation through institutions is not unlikely. This theory 
could therefore induce an aspect to the increased commitment to the African 
Union that realism refuses. Where there is common ground to be found and 
states have goals that may be reached through cooperation, states may seek this 
option. The benefits that IOs have to offer such efforts of cooperation, makes 
this all the more likely according to this theory. Though the theory still 
maintain that the states are the decision makers and that surrendering of 
sovereignty thus will seem unlikely, the possibility that the state leaders 
decided to give an integrated cooperation a chance does not seem impossible. 
The creation of article 4 (h) may have come as a consequence of the three main 
actors’ realization that further integration was needed in order to make the new 
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organization effective. In order to decide how this theory would explain the 
creation of Article 4 (h), the thesis will now explore the premises of this theory. 
 
Liberal institutionalism, though it has been one of “[t]he major challenger[s] to 
realism” (Grieco1988:486), does not directly address the question of how to 
prevent war, but focus on “explaining why economic and environmental 
cooperation among states are more likely than realists recognize” 
(Mearsheimer 1995:14). However it does not define cooperation as equivalent 
with harmony. Cooperation can occur in a mixture of conflicting and 
complementary interests (Axelrod et al.1985: 226). Liberal institutionalism, 
like realists, treats states as rational egoists in an anarchic world, where 
cooperation and institutions does not occur frequently or across conflict lines 
(Keohane et. al.1995:39). According to Axelrod and Keohane actors likeliness 
to cooperate depends on three situational dimensions; mutuality of interest, the 
shadow of the future and the number of actors (Axelrod et al.1985: 228).  
 
A good aid to describe and analyze the likelihood of actors cooperating is game 
theory. A good description to illustrate how the prospect of cooperation can 
change is Prisoners Dilemma, which is a game where the highest payoff is 
rewarded the part that defects, given that the other party chooses to cooperate. 
The problem is that no party has information of what the other one will do. If 
they could agree to cooperate they would both achieve the second highest 
payoff, but since they have no way of knowing this they will both defect and 
both get the second worst payoff, the lowest one being the situation where one 
party is defected on by the other party after choosing to cooperate. Thus the 
Prisoners Dilemma has a preference ordering for both parties of DC > CC > 
DD > CD. This situation is easily depicted in the anarchic world order states 
operate in. However, the circumstances may change in such a way that the 
preference ordering changes to CC > DC > DD > CD. In this case it is a less 
conflictual game called a Stag Hunt (Axelrod et al. 1985:229). One example of 
this is that after world wars the pay-off matrix can shift temporarily to a Stag 
 38
Hunt as a result of the victorious states may prefer to cooperate to hold down 
the defeated aggressor. These co-operations are, however, easily disposed for 
defection after a relative short period of time. If one side fears that the other 
might defect, the game changes to Deadlock with preference order DC > DD > 
CC > CD, where the dominant strategy is defection for both sides and the likely 
outcome is DD (Axelrod et al. 1985:230).  
 
4.3.1 Relative Gains and Cooperation 
Relative gains is, as mentioned earlier, actors concerns about what the other 
parties in any cooperation gets in comparison to what the actor it self gets. 
With realists the relative-gains logic has been a vantage point in their 
arguments against cooperation. Liberal institutionalists however believe that 
institutions themselves can be the very remedy for this. Obviously they 
recognize that where two states have fundamentally conflicting interests, 
institutions will not be significant (Keohane et al.1995:44), but there are other 
situations where relative gains can be significant and institutions increases the 
likelihood and the possibility for international cooperation. Keohane (1995:44) 
finds that the issues that need to be confronted in this aspect is “1) the 
conditions under which relative gains are important; and 2) the role of 
institutions when distributional issues are significant – that is, when relative 
gains are at stake”. There are great variations in the extent to whether relative 
gains matter or not. It relies heavily on the conditions in the surroundings, such 
as how many actors that are involved and whether military advantages favors 
defense or offence (Keohane et al. 1995:44). Duncan Snidal (Keohane et 
al.1995:44) has shown that relative gain concerns rarely affect the probability 
of cooperation if there are more than two actors and/or the prospect of great 
absolute gains is present. 
 
As for the second issue it is essential to identify two problems states are faced 
with when attempting to cooperate. One is the fear of being cheated. There is 
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usually also a problem of “coordinating their actions on a particular stable 
cooperative outcome (solving the problem of multiple equilibria, in game 
theoretic terminology)” (Keohane et al. 1995:45). Usually more than one 
cooperative outcome exits and the states involved might not agree upon which 
one is the best. Disagreement on how to cooperate is the principal barrier to 
cooperation in such coordination games (Keohane et al.1995:45). Institutions, 
all though not the only solution6, may provide the necessary mechanisms such 
as “constructed focal points” for cooperation in complex coordination 
situations involving many states (Keohane et al.1995:45).  
 
Liberal theory argues that institutions, by providing information to the 
participating states about how the gains are distributed, may eliminate the 
problem of states worrying that they are not getting as much as the next state. 
The possibility of assuring for example that the gains will be equally 
distributed over time or by disclosing information of military resources and 
capabilities, makes cooperation that much more likely, according to the relative 
gains logic (Keohane et al.1995:45-46). The disclosing of information also 
minimizes the fear of being cheated as it is presented with the example of the 
Prisoners Dilemma –game. 
 
4.3.2 Liberal Institutionalism applied on the case 
Liberal Institutionalism has the same basic presumptions as realism but the 
assumptions in respect to cooperation are somewhat different. In the event of 
concurrent interests institutionalism suggest that states may be willing to 
cooperate without the necessity of hidden agendas. As such, the following 
hypothesis can be presented: 
 
                                                 
6 Keohane notes that Stephen Krasner as argued that coordination problems can be solved by the unilateral 
exercise of power by the strongest state in “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto 
Frontier” April 1991. 
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H2: The main actors found enough common ground, goals and interests 
that they introduced a policy of intervention.  
 
The theory is based on the assumption that state leaders have some concurring 
interest that will benefit the state, but through cooperation with others. One 
should thus expect to find evidence for this. Also, there should be evident that 
the state leaders are promoting the states interests. Furthermore, that the 
creation of the AU and Article (h) gives the states a mutual benefit that will 
increase the states absolute gains is a prerequisite for this hypothesis to be 
strengthened. 
 
4.4 Constructivism 
Constructivism addresses a whole new perspective compared to the two 
abovementioned theoretical approaches. It delivers a new possibility for 
explaining why the state leaders of the AU decided to ratify Article 4 (h). 
When the states are not the only possible agents of change, and their 
preferences are not given, but can in fact be altered from an outside agent, 
other types of questions need to be asked. If the social structures are granted as 
a given, what may cause an actor to change its preferences, or rather to 
discover them? Is it possible that the state leaders were “socialized” to adjust 
their preferences? Is there a “teacher” in this context that have influenced the 
states to adjust their preferences in such a way that pan-Africanism all of a 
sudden is such a good idea that they are wiling to give up state sovereignty for 
it? Or could they have another motive for giving this new initiative such 
increased power? Who would in any event be this “teacher”? 
 
This theory is different from the two previous ones from the outset. Where the 
two other theories base their claims on the assumption that all states have a 
specific set of interests, Martha Finnemore (1996:1) argues that this is not 
 41
necessarily so, exogenously. In stead of treating states interests as stabile 
assumptions that can be the basis for interstate analysis, she holds that state 
interests and the way states define their interests is something that needs to be 
problematized. “Aspirations to develop a generalizable theory of international 
politics modeled on theories in the natural sciences and economics have led 
most international relations scholars in the United States since the 1960s to 
assume rather than problematize state interests”(Ibid).  
 
It is not that she does not agree with the general assumptions that states want 
power, security and wealth, but she goes further to ask what kind of power, 
security and wealth do they want? And what do they want with it? “Ultimately, 
power and wealth are means, not ends” (Ibid: 2), she claims and goes further to 
say that “States are embedded in dense networks of transnational and 
international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their 
role in that world. States are socialized to want certain things by the 
international society in which they and the people in them live”(Ibid)7. That 
states might be taught preferences in this social context is precisely what 
Finnemore is saying: “Receptivity to the teaching of preferences implies a 
more social character for states than is generally acknowledged in international 
relations theory. It implies that the international environment is more than a 
‘billiard table’ constraining state action. It implies that states are embedded in a 
social structure and are ‘socialized’ to a degree not allowed by the more 
conventional, self-contained conceptions of the state. The role of ‘teacher’ for 
international organizations similarly implies a more active and causal character 
than most theories currently allow. Most international relations theories are 
strongly state-centric. International organizations may mediate state interaction 
by providing rules of the game, supplying information, monitoring behavior, or 
creating transparency; ultimately, however, they are understood to be creations 
of states and servants of state interests. According them a more autonomous 
                                                 
7 Emphasis original. 
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and causal status, particularly as shapers of actor’s interests, would violate the 
fundamental structure of neorealist and neoliberal theories. It would embed 
states in a more diverse context of causal factors and push beyond ‘the limits of 
realism’” (Ibid: 13). One of the fundamental issues here will thus be to 
acknowledge whether there in fact is a “teacher” situation here and if so if that 
could cause the African Union to change its preferences.  
 
4.4.1 Learning and teaching 
What is essentially the case in this theory is “whether, analytically, one treats 
actors, capabilities, and preferences as given and derives social structures from 
their interaction, or whether one takes the social structures as a given and treats 
actors, their preferences and powers, as defined by the social system(s) in 
which they are embedded (Ibid: 14).” The theory goes on to suggest that state 
interests are defined in the context of “internationally held norms of what is 
good and appropriate”(Ibid: 2). This influences the decision makers and it 
influences the public who may support those decision makers or restrict their 
power (Ibid.). When the world is changing, the states will adapt its behavior 
and its interests will adjust accordingly. Finnemore argues that though the 
assumptions that states want power, security and wealth are good assumptions, 
states are not always faced with a threat for e.g. survival. Therefore, it is 
important to look at the internationally held norms and values. These change 
over time and thus create coordinated shifts in state interests and behavior 
across the system (Ibid.). It is these “patterns of coordinated, system-wide 
redefinition of interests that look odd form conventional perspectives”(Ibid: 3). 
States’ redefinitions of interests are often not the consequence of external threat 
or demands by domestic groups, but shaped by internationally shared norms 
and values that “shape and give meaning to international political life”(Ibid.). 
This is contesting what conventional theories share as basic assumptions: that 
preferences are unproblematic and that the source of state preferences is 
located within the state (Ibid: 7). Under these assumptions one would expect 
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different actors with different preferences to act differently. “Similar action by 
dissimilar actors in the absence of constraint is anomalous under these 
theories”(Ibid: 6). Within a social structural framework however, it is to be 
expected that international norms of behavior and shared values make similar 
behavioral claims on dissimilar actors (Ibid.). This could be addressed with the 
argument that the state administrations are responding to an already existing 
issue that needs to be dealt with and is thus looking elsewhere for solutions to a 
similar problem, in which case the “impetus for the learning lies within the 
states”(Ibid: 12). Finnemore however investigate cases where there are active 
teachers8. In these cases the interest of the states change after a new “interest” 
is presented and then “taught” by a different actor (Ibid: 12).  Both the 
definition of the “problem” and the strategies for solving it came from outside 
the state. Thus, the theory states that the states need not be the agents of 
change. IOs or other social structures can affect state preferences in a variety of 
ways. 
 
 
4.4.2 Constructivism applied on the case 
The theory triggers a magnitude of these questions, many of which seem 
relevant, but out of reach for the scope of the other theories applied here. The 
main actors, whom the thesis addresses in the next chapter, represent different 
states and thus different interests and different capabilities. Does this theory 
present the relieving answer to how they could unite on such an article? The 
questions are, if nothing else, intriguing enough to deserve answering. Since 
constructivism is very different from the former theories the expected findings 
should differ accordingly. The basic assumption that states will act as rational 
                                                 
8 Finnemores book ”National Interests in International Society” (1996) investigates the cases of how the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) “taught” international decision makers in states to adapt the first 
Geneva Convention, how the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
“taught” states that they needed a science bureaucracies and how the World Bank “taught” states a new definition 
of the needs of developing countries. 
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unitary actors for example is not a prerequisite for action in constructivism. 
Socializing however is an important factor that should be significant in 
presence for this theory to be of explanatory value. The hypothesis from this 
teory can be presented as: 
 
H3: The AU was socialized to adapt a policy of intervention. 
 
If constructivism can explain this case it should be evident that there is a trend 
in the world in general that leads towards this behavior as the creation of 
Article 4 (h). If such a trend can be established it should also be possible to 
identify that the events in this case are influenced by that trend (there is a 
“teacher” situation). Finally, to strengthen this hypothesis, there should not be 
evidence of strategic actor behavior. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has gone through the different aspects of choosing a theory for 
analysis of the case. A critical review of the applicability of using IR theory on 
African politics in general and on the case specifically has been presented. 
Though the thesis recognizes the critique to be relevant and valid, the case 
study that this case investigates should be able to proceed and benefit form an 
analysis based upon three of the most dominating IR theories. These three have 
then been presented with a following contextualization and a general 
hypothesis to the case. To every hypothesis there are certain criteria listed to 
provide an operational set to enable analysis. Hence the thesis is now equipped 
with three different hypotheses with a set of operational criteria that enables 
testing of each hypothesis. The three theories provide a broad specter of 
possible reasons to explain this event. The focus on both actor and structural 
variables and different conceptions on states willingness to commit to and 
international organization should provide the thesis with a good and complete 
analysis of the data. The next chapter will be dedicated to presenting this data. 
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5. States, Leaders and Surroundings 
This chapter will build on the results of the previous one. We have seen that the 
description of the hypotheses in the previous chapter ask for some specific 
evidence in order to either strengthen or weaken the different explanations. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 explicitly mention main actors and state leaders actions. 
Thus it is important to look at what reality these actors found themselves in at 
the time of the decision. In this chapter I will make a selection of the main 
actors in the creation of this article. I will describe what circumstances they 
where operating within and to some extent what reasons they may have had to 
want a closer level of cooperation with other African states and/or a stronger 
continental organization. Hypothesis 3 suggests that there exist some kind of 
trend in the international community, and that this trend is socializing the AU 
and it principal actors in to behaving in a particular manner. It is therefore 
necessary to have a look at what measures that have been made internationally 
in the area of intervention and state sovereignty. This chapter will do so. The 
chapter is divided into an introduction and a selection of the main actors; a 
description of their situation; and finally a description of the international 
measures on intervention and state sovereignty.  
  
5.1 The relevant information  
 
 “National sovereignty can only be 
meaningful if it discharges a certain 
level of responsibility in providing 
adequate protection and assistance 
to citizens and all those under state 
jurisdiction”  
 46
Olusegun Obasanjo (March 2001) in Deng & 
Zartman 
 
The creation of the AU was filled with “political and realpolitik difficulties, the 
clash and accommodation of strategic self-interests and foreign policy postures 
of the major actors inside and outside Africa” (Francis2006:25). The wave of 
democratization in Africa in the early 1990s was certainly a factor in reforming 
the OAU, as was the civil wars, where the genocide in Rwanda caused the 
strongest response. This however, is not enough to explain the magnitude and 
speed of the transformation into the AU (Sturman2004:1). As Thomas Kwasi 
Tieku shows in his article “Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of 
Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African Union” (2004) there 
were mainly three actors in this process, and they each had a different agenda 
that led to the establishment of the AU. The main actors Tieku identifies are the 
president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki, the president of Nigeria Olusegun 
Obasanjo and Libya’s leader Colonel Muammar al-Ghaddafi.  
 
Tieku’s article claim that it was the decisions of the presidents Obasanjo and 
Mbeki to reform the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to accommodate 
their new foreign policies and Colonel Ghaddafi’s attempt to use the OAU to 
re-emerge into African politics that led to the creation of the AU 
(Tieku2004:251). It is impossible to identify these three state leaders as the 
only causes to the creation of the AU. The OAU was inhibited by numerous 
problems that made the organization ineffective and it might have been time to 
change it after all. Also the post-Cold War Africa was facing diverse and 
pressing problems that, like the independence of the 1960s forced the African 
leaders to consider the project of pan-African unity (Francis2006:25). However 
these three state leaders actively engaged in reformative measures that, where 
they to be accommodated, would change the OAU drastically. Hence these 
state leaders made an active choice to be a part of something that led to the 
creation of the AU and, more specifically for this thesis, article 4 (h) in the 
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Constitutional Act. It might also be a timely reminder at this point that this 
thesis will not investigate why or how the African Union was created, but 
rather why the rigid principle of sovereignty and non-intervention was 
abandoned. The concept of sovereignty has been strongly embedded in the 
Organization of African Unity and thusly in the political culture of 
international African politics. The massive turnover in this respect must 
obviously be seen in context with the world, but also as an African act. 
Through the UN the practice in the international politics of the world has 
turned away from the rigid sovereignty regime. The world has since the UN-
pact gradually been building this down through ratifying conventions of 
international proportions and allowing neutral observers to control whether 
they are being properly conducted. This has, though not so much formally, 
been a surrendering of the unique power that state sovereignty provided state 
leaders after the European peace in Westphalia in 1648. The African continent 
has, as discussed above, for different reasons been holding on to this concept. 
But there has, according to some, been “an emerging phenomenon in the 
regionalization of conflict management and the sharing of responsibilities for 
international peace and security between the United Nations and regional 
intergovernmental ‘collective security’ organizations or coalitions of willing 
states in Africa” (Francis 2006: 117).  
 
Now that they are formally leaving this principle the question of why emerges. 
After that question, of course, comes the question of how to find the why. The 
theories presented above are tools that can be used to give a better 
understanding of how international politics work under certain circumstances 
and given certain presumptions. These theories give us perspectives on how we 
should understand the actors in international relations. Now one must choose 
what part of the world that is necessary to analyze in order to get a picture as 
complete as possible. It is obviously not possible to include everything that 
happens in the world in an analysis. It is physically impossible. The problem is 
how to select what part of reality that needs to be investigated in order to get a 
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full worthy picture of what happened and who participated in the most 
significant parts of the process. Prior to the Sirte summit the Executive Council 
was already presented with two other proposals (Tieku2004:253). The first one, 
supported by South Africa, asked the Council to study and make 
recommendations on how to overhaul the OAU. The second one was Nigeria’s 
proposal on implementing the CSSDCA into the OAU. Ghaddafi’s proposal of 
the ‘United States of Africa’ now made the number of proposals to adjust or 
change the OAU three (Tieku2004:261). To accommodate all three proposals 
as best they could, the 33 African leaders attending the summit decided to 
replace the OAU altogether. I have chosen to focus on the main actors in the 
process of the decision. The actors in the African Union (AU) are the states. 
The spokespersons for the states in the AU are the state leaders. Thusly, what I 
need to do to identify the major actors in the decision process is to identify the 
most significant state leaders in the process. The main literature on the subject 
supports my decision of these three leaders. The next important step is to 
describe the circumstances and background under which these leaders were 
subject to when making the decision of implementing Article 4(h) into the new 
African Union.  
5.2 Mbeki: 
“…none of our countries, relative 
to the Union enjoys unlimited 
sovereignty and is therefore free to 
do with its people what it wishes.”  
-Thabo Mbeki in a speech given at 
the Nigerian Institute of 
International Affairs, Lagos, 
December 06, 2003 
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South Africa was the last member to join the OAU, two months after the 
inauguration of President Nelson Mandela in 1994. Though Mandela’s rise to 
power, and the establishment of democracy in South Africa was greeted with 
joy on the continent, there was also some grudging over the “moral 
heavyweight authority on the scene” (Sturman2004:3). Mandela declared a 
new foreign policy based on the promotion of human rights and democracy 
(Ibid.). From its earlier branding as an international pariah, the country was 
now assuming its new role as a growing middle power in the world 
(Schraeder2001:230). South Africa accounted for almost one third of Africa’s 
total GDP (Sturman2004:3), and this new moral line was met with suspicion 
from the neighboring states and co-members of the South African 
Development Community (SADC). In fact Zimbawean President Mugabe 
rallied Angola and Namibia to isolate South Africa in the regional organization 
(Ibid.).  
 
When Mbeki was chosen president of South Africa in 1999 he continued his 
predecessor Mandela’s liberal politics in order to enhance South Africa’s 
image internationally and thus increase international trade. This was a hard 
case to sell with some of his own party fellows in the ANC and also it was not 
popular outside the country that he openly criticized military governments as 
rouge states, as some of these had harbored the ANC during the Apartheid 
regime in South Africa (Tieku 2004:254). Both Mbeki and Mandela had 
realized that the future of post-Apartheid South Africa acting as an economic 
giant in inter-African politics was in a peaceful and stabile Africa (Francis 
2006:27). Consequently Mbeki adjusted his strategy and instead called upon a 
“reconstruction of the African identity in order, first, to conclude the work of 
earlier Pan-Africanist movements and, second, to re-invent the African state to 
play its effective and rightful role on the global terrain. According to the South 
African Government, the African Renaissance is a ‘holistic vision … aimed at 
promoting peace, prosperity, democracy, sustainable development, progressive 
leadership and good governance’” (Tieku2004:255). Mbeki cleverly 
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reintroduced the phrase ‘African Renaissance’ to serve as the conceptual 
framework of the new approach and thus took the position as the leader of this 
phrase that had been “the strengthening of democratic practices and economic 
liberalization throughout Africa since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989” 
(Schraeder2001:233). This was an easier package to sell and far less provoking 
than the earlier open condemnation of non-democratic states and the aggressive 
liberal line that was first drawn up. The SADC was practically paralyzed in 
regards to political and security issues after the Mandela government had 
condemned the invasion of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in the complex 
war of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Sturman2004:3). South Africa’s 
expressed desire to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) did not seem to have a future in SADC after that (Sturman2004:5).  It 
was within this context that Mbeki decided that reforming the OAU at his first 
appearance at the 1999 summit in Algiers, would be the best approach to 
achieve his goals (Tieku2004:255). He felt that the image of the OAU needed 
improvement and that the organisation might be strengthened by working 
actively to achieve the goals of the African Renaissance (Tieku2004:255). To 
influence the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, however he got 
help from president Obasanjo. 
 
5.3 Obasanjo: 
The road to the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-
operation in Africa (CSSDCA) and also Obasanjo’s role in Article 4 (h) in the 
Constitutive Act started at the Kampala Forum on Security, Stability, 
Development and Co-operation in Africa in Kampala, Uganda from the 19th 
day of May to the 22nd day of May 1991. This was obviously before the 
African Union was established, but the general principles of the proposed 
CSSDCA states amongst other things that ‘The security, stability and 
development of every African country are inseparably linked with those of 
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other African countries’ (OAU/AU Summit (a)). The declaration from the 
Kampala Conference recommends the heads of States and Governments in 
Africa to launch the CSSDCA (Ibid.), but the African Heads of State and 
Government meeting in the OAU rejected it at the 1991 Summit in Abuja, 
Nigeria. This was primarily due to the opposition of Libya’s Muammar al-
Ghaddafi, Sudan’s Omar Hassan Ahmed el-Bashir and Kenya’s Daniel Arap 
Moi (Tieku2004:258). Obasanjo had then been working on these ideas since an 
expert meeting in his own organization, the African Leadership Forum in 
collaboration with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in Paris 1990(Ibid.). The issue of CSSDCA disappeared 
from the OAU agenda as subsequent attempts from Obasanjo failed and his 
criticism of the government in his own country led to his imprisonment in 
1995.  
 
Nigeria had previously been involved in the peacekeeping operation in Liberia 
in 1990, when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
had made the unprecedented move of establishing a common peacekeeping 
force to help end the bloodshed of the civil war that was going on in Liberia 
(Human Rights Watch 1993). The force, known as the Economic Community 
Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), comprised of a vast majority of 
Nigerians and justified its intervention with the argument that it was no longer 
an internal conflict “since thousands of their own nationals were trapped in 
Liberia and tens of thousands of refugees had fled to neighboring countries” 
(Ibid.). The intervention was not a complete success as the ECOMOG-force 
was said both to take sides in the conflict and failing to maintain the discipline 
of a peacekeeping force by e.g. not hitting civilian targets (Ibid., also Human 
Rights Watch 2003). The ECOWAS has nevertheless kept their initiative for 
peacekeeping in the region. In 1999 the organization changed its definition of 
security to involve humanitarian security (Ball & Fayemi2005:6.4.1). It has 
established a Mediation and Security Council that will deliberate on the level 
of Heads of State and Government as well as on the Ministerial and 
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Ambassadorial (Ibid.). “As stipulated in the Protocol, ECOMOG’s tasks will 
entail: observation and monitoring; peacekeeping and restoration of peace; 
humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian disaster; enforcement of 
sanctions including embargo; preventive deployment; peace-building, 
disarmament and demobilization; and policing activities”(Ibid). As mentioned, 
Nigeria took a considerable role in ECOWAS peacekeeping initiative. 
Although the OAU had given rhetorical support to the initiative on a number of 
occasions, the formal support seemed to be hindered by the non-intervention 
policy of the organization (Aning2000). The initiative was thus still kept on the 
regional level, leaving the financial, human and political costs to the ECOWAS 
states.  
 
Due to the structure of the OAU it became imperative for Obasanjo to reform 
the organization; in particular he “wanted to reposition the OAU so that it 
would become the central institution for dealing with Africa’s security, stability 
and development challenges” (Tieku2004:257). This seemed difficult within 
the limits of the present organization. Obasanjo’s victory at the election in 1999 
gave him an opportunity to re-introduce the document for the OAU. By now it 
was even more important for Obasanjo to get the Pan-African organization to 
assume responsibility for the security, stability and development of the 
continent. The peacekeeping operation in Liberia and Sierra Leone was 
revealed to be costing $ 1 million during the presidential election campaign. 
This aggregated so much displeasure among the public that a drastic reduction 
in Nigeria’s involvement in Sierra Leone had become imperative for the new 
government (Tieku2004:259). Obasanjo’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 
was even more obligated to do something about this situation after Obasanjo 
declared, during the election campaign, that “it was unacceptable for Nigeria to 
waste money in Sierra Leone when those funds could be used to develop 
Nigeria” (Doyle 1999). The Obasanjo government created a new Ministry of 
Co-operation and Integration in Africa, whose work was supported by a new 
Peace and Conflict Resolution Institute, was mandated to develop a policy that 
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would help institutionalize the ideas of the CSSDCA within the OAU 
(Tieku2004:259). The idea was to enable the OAU “to take centre-stage in the 
resolution and management of domestic conflicts in Africa” (Ibid.). This was, 
of course, to ensure external help in regards to the Sierra Leone situation 
amongst others, and also to secure Nigeria’s vanguard role in West Africa 
without having to be put in a similar situation in the future (Ibid.). PDP 
reasoned that through this action, “future African peacekeeping missions could 
also be borne by other relatively well endowed African countries” (Ibid.). It 
was against this background that Obasanjo went to the OAU summit in Algiers 
in July 1999. 
 
5.4 Ghaddafi: 
After a long period of volatile foreign politics towards the sub-Saharan Africa, 
Ghaddafi arrived at the OAU summit in Algiers in June, 1999 with an 
entourage of 200. His re-entry into African politics, after a longer period of 
promoting Libya as the “Greater Arab Homeland”9, and the “base for the 
liberation of Palestine”(Ogunbadejo1986:34) has been the object of much 
speculation. What is clear is that it represented a definitive shift in Ghaddafi’s 
foreign politics (Huliaras2001:11).  
 
The foreign politics of Libya had not been unknown to interventionist 
behavior. Though not through any official declaration or multinational 
agreement, Ghaddafi had for many years been concerned with the internal 
affairs of others. Especially in the 70’s and 80’s, Libya was involved in the 
internal affairs of a number of African countries, supporting regimes Ghaddafi 
approved of or aiding liberation or opposition movements (Huliaras2001: 6). 
The involvement in sub-Saharan Africa was “…directed towards liberating 
                                                 
9 The name of the Libyan state-owned radio was for three decades known as the “Voice of the Greater Arab 
Homeland”, but was renamed the “Voice of Africa” in 1998 (Huliaras2001:10). 
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African countries under colonial or apartheid regimes, isolating Israel and 
propoganding Islam”(Huliaras2001: 6). Hence Ghaddafi supported numerous 
African independence movements (in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe) and offered significant economic and military support to states 
that were willing to cut ties with Israel (Huliaras2001: 6). The intervention in 
Chad is by far the most significant external involvement Libya has ever had10 
(Huliaras2001: 6). For many years Ghaddafi had been looking to the Arab 
world for mutual co-operation, unity and support. This is visible in his vital 
efforts to build an alliance with Egypt and Somalia from his proposals of 
forming federations with both in his early years in office, through multiple 
different involvements in supporting opposition groups and employing 
diplomatic pressure in many years to come (Ogunbadejo1986: 34-42). These 
attempts failed miserably however, and led to hostility between the USA 
friendly governments of Egypt and Sudan, and Libya. Libya’s support of 
opposition groups and plots against both state leaders of Egypt and Sudan 
caused them to state that Ghaddafi was a “vicious criminal, 100 per cent sick 
and possessed by the demon” and a “split personality – both evil”, respectively 
(Ogunbadejo1986: 35). The Chad conflict proved to make Ghaddafi even more 
unpopular amongst the western governments involved, herein France and the 
USA, who both was compelled to send considerable forces to aid the Habré 
government in Chad11(Ogunbadejo1986: 44-45).  Furthermore the Lockerbie 
                                                 
10 This happened after Libya’s leader Ghaddafi sent armed forces into the country to support the current leader of 
the state capitol of Chad, Goukhouni Ouddei. Ouddei and Ghaddafi had agreed on an alliance to put Chad in a 
political union with Libya, but due to civil war inside Chad Ghaddafi deployed forces to ensure the victory of his 
ally. The neighboring states saw this as a problem and a potential threat to regional stability and pleaded the OAU 
to act on the matter. This led to an agreement where Libyan forces would withdraw and be replaced by a 
peacekeeping force from the OAU. Ouddei accepted this as he was still leading the fraction that controlled the 
state capitol, and thus the leader of the legitimate government as far as OAU policy was concerned. However, 
when the planned negotiations broke down as a result of Ouddei’s refusal to accept his main adversary as an equal 
opponent, fights broke back out. The peacekeeping force of the OAU kept neutral through these fights and Ouddei 
was forced to surrender the capitol to the other rebel army. When the OAU found itself in a country that was no 
longer invaded by Libyan forces and with a new government in place, it also found their reason to stay seized to 
exist. The proposal of a political union with Libya was gone and the territorial boundaries would remain. This 
made it easy for the OAU to return to their original strategy; to recognize the party who controlled the capitol at 
any given time as the legitimate government (Bøås & Dokken2002:86). 
11 For a more detailed description of the USA and French involvement in the conflict, read Oye Ogunbadejo 
“Qaddafi and Africa’s International Relations” (1986). See Table of Authorities for details. 
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bombing12 incident where Libyan officials were accused of international 
terrorism culminated in to Security Council sanctions (United Nations Security 
Council) and worsened Libya’s face towards the western world and the USA in 
particular, whom have maintained unilateral sanctions towards Libya (U.S. 
Department of State 2007).  
 
During his many years of struggling with UN-sanctions and unilateral 
sanctions from the USA, Libya never got any significant support from the Arab 
community (Huliaras2001:12). From the sub-Saharan Africa and the OAU, 
however, he got support both through actively breaking the no-flight-
sanctions13 and also at the 33rd OAU annual summit in 1997, Harare, 
Zimbabwe, where the African leaders noted the “These obnoxious sanctions 
affect not only the Libyan people, but also the neighboring countries as well as 
the African workers from other countries from the continent” (Ibid.). The 
support from black Africa was evident and reaffirmed at the fifth Extraordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU where 
the session added resolutions addressing the Lockerbie Issue (EAHG/Dec. 
3(V)) and a “Special Motion of Thanks to the leader of the Great Socialist 
Libyan Jamahiriya Brother Muammar Al Ghaddafi”(OAU/AU Summit (b)). 
 
It being evident that two of the most significant African leaders were aiming to 
reform the OAU, Ghaddafi quickly invited the African leaders to Sirte, Libya 
for an extraordinary summit from 6 to 9 September in 1999 in order to ‘discuss 
ways and means of making the OAU effective’ (Tieku2004:260). But Ghaddafi 
also had his own reasons for inviting to this summit. The Libyan leader had 
been in the “vanguard for the creation of an African Union as a concrete 
manifestation for the political willingness to unite Africa in the post-Cold War 
                                                 
12 On 21 December 1988 a bomb destroyed Pan Am flight 103. The remains landed in and around the Scottish 
town of Lockerbie. 
13 In July 1998 the acting chairman of the OAU, the President of Burkina Faso flew to Libya, thus breaching the 
air embargo. In the autumn of 1998, several othe African leaders followed his example by arriving Tripoli by air. 
These included the heads of state of Niger, Chad, Mali, the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Uganda, Gambia 
and Zimbabwe (Huliaras2001:13). 
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era” (Francis2006:25). Not only did this present an opportunity for him “to take 
credit for the re-launch of continental integration initiatives in Africa” 
(Tieku2004:261). He also wanted to state his return to African geopolitics and 
his commitment to black Africa (sub-Sahara). This is the context to which 
Ghaddafi announced in public media that he was inviting the African leaders to 
an extraordinary summit to create a ‘United States of Africa’ (Tieku2004:261). 
 
5.5 Surroundings 
The creation of Article 4 (h) in the constitutive act of the AU is by no means 
the first mention of intervention in the history of international relations. 
Though it is historical in it being the first international treaty to recognize the 
right to intervene on the basis of a humanitarian purpose (Baimu & Sturman 
2003:40). However, the idea of intervention, to defy the sanctity of sovereignty 
has been much debated and also executed prior to this. “The creation of havens 
in Kurdistan in 1991 was a watershed indicating the extent to which 
sovereignty was under siege” (Chopra & Weiss 1995:89). The operation came 
after a Security Council Resolution (688) which insisted “that Iraq allow 
immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in 
need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary 
facilities for their operations” (UN Resolution (i)). Though Cuba, Yemen and 
Zimbabwe voted against the measure and China and India abstained, it still had 
an effect in putting humanitarianism on the international agenda, battling the 
concept of sovereignty (Chopra & Weiss 1995:89).  
 
Since the UN Charter of 1945 the concept of sovereignty has been formalized 
for all its members. Article 2 (1) states that all members are sovereign equals 
and that neither circumstance nor anything in the Charter shall permit the 
organization to intervene in any member state (Article 2 (7)). The Article also 
demands that no member stat shall be permitted to use force or the threat of 
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force in their international relations, but settle their international disputes in 
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered (Article 2 (3-4)). This sets the standard of conducting international 
relations through the organization and in the spirit of the principle of state 
sovereignty. The need to codify and specify the circumstances under which 
interference in domestic affairs from any outside agent was considered against 
the potential risk of abuse from states of such a definition and left out14 
(Chopra & Weiss 1995: 92). Bound from the charter however, the UN and the 
world did recognize the need for some form of humanitarian intervention. In 
December 1988 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 43/131, which 
formally recognized civilians rights to international aid and the role of NGOs 
in the event of disasters, man-made or natural (UN Resolution (ii)). In 1990 
these rights were reaffirmed by General Assembly Resolution 45/100 (UN 
Resolution (iii)). And, as Chopra and Weiss (1995:95) puts it: “with the 
passage of Security Council Resolution 688 four months later, the issue of 
humanitarian interventions was thrust squarely onto the international political 
stage when the acute needs of 1, 5 million Kurds were interpreted as a threat to 
international peace and security”.  Put in other words: The internal affairs of 
one sovereign state were considered to be of a nature such that it was a threat to 
international security. This trend followed with the expanding role of the 
United Nations. This included election monitoring, promoting of human rights 
and humanitarian affairs. These tasks had formerly been considered to be 
beyond the competence of the Security Council, but were now included in the 
first summit of 1992 (Chopra & Weiss 1995:95). The same year UN troops 
were deployed in Yugoslavia and Cambodia, and the use of force to deliver 
humanitarian assistance in Bosnia (Resolution 776) and Somalia (Resolution 
794) were authorized by the Security Council. This was of course never in 
conflict with Article 2 in the Charter. There were never any talks about leaving 
the concept of sovereignty, but these tendencies showed will to reflect on the 
way the international society was built.  
                                                 
14 For a discussion of the legal debate on this subject see Chopra & Weiss (1995). 
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The Organization of African Unity was also involved in this and the Chairman 
of the OAU spoke at the forty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly 
to this effect. The OAU had previously always followed the principles of non-
interference in domestic affairs, respect of territorial boundaries and state 
sovereignty. This had been, as have been discussed, the way for the OAU to 
maintain stability between the states on the continent. One of the most 
important instruments to achieve this was that the OAU accepted who ever was 
in control of the states capitol as the legitimate government (Clapham 1996: 
112). There are two exceptions to this, prior to the abovementioned cases. The 
first one was the invitation of the new Democratic Arab Republic of Sahrawi in 
1980, which led Morocco to leave the organization three years later in protest 
(Bøås & Dokken 2002: 85). The other exception was in regards to Chad where 
the OAU actually intervened in the state due to extreme domestic disturbances. 
The OAU did little other than show will to act and thus creating room for 
negotiations (Ibid: 86). The OAU force never participated in battle, but stood 
by and watched as one of the rebel armies triumphed over the other and did not 
outgrow its stay after one leader safely commanded the state capitol (Ibid.). As 
this example shows, the international relations on the African continent have 
been mainly focused on keeping the stability between the states. Even the 
intervention in Somalia through Resolution 794 was stated in the resolution to 
be of “unique character […], deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, 
requiring an immediate and exceptional response” (UN Resolution (iv)). Being 
extreme or not, this intervention was initiated and organized through the UN, 
and as the example above shows, the policy of the OAU was mainly focused on 
maintaining the inter state stability that the non-intervention system provided. 
The rest of the world however has not made these situations remain unique, 
and this was not the last time interventions were made with international 
consensus and for the sake of humanitarianism. Indeed the report “The 
Responsibility to Protect” put forward by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 deliberates over the issue of “the 
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so-called “right of humanitarian intervention”: the question of when, if ever, it 
is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action, 
against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other 
state”(Evans &Sahnoun2001:VII). The Report suggests some core principles in 
regards to the concept of sovereignty and also principles of military 
intervention. Suffice to mention here are the basic principles of sovereignty: 
“A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for 
the protection of its people lies with the state itself.  
B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or 
unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect”(Evans &Sahnoun2001:XI). The report 
debates this issue and does also make recommendations as to how the 
international community should respond to such situations as mentioned under 
“B” above and to what responsibility and under what authority it deems it 
appropriate and necessary to break the principle of non-intervention. The report 
stands as further testimony that humanitarianism is now on the international 
agenda, “battling the concept of sovereignty” (Chopra & Weiss1995:89). 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the actual events that took place in relation to the 
creation of article 4 (h). There has been made a selection of three main actors 
and these have been described along with their surrounding circumstances. 
Also the general surroundings relevant to this kind of politics in the world have 
been addressed. It was emphasized that the three actors described above had 
their own individual agenda, both for the continental organization, but also for 
their own state. There does also seem to be some evidence of a norm in the 
international society when it comes to intervention in the name of 
humanitarianism from the discussion above. This together should deliver what 
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the operationalization asks for. We now have the facts to check and the tools to 
check them with. What remains is to put them together.  
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6. Analysis 
This chapter will check the criteria listed in the theory against the information 
above. To do this should render us with an understanding of how much these 
theories actually can explain of the case at hand. This will thus be somewhat of 
a theory-testing chapter. The chapter will use the criteria listed in the 
operationalization earlier and the events described in the previous chapter to 
see what is a better fit. From here it should be possible to analyze which of the 
presented theories offers the better explanation for this decision. The chapter 
will go through each one of the three hypotheses, each in its own segregated 
part.  
6.1 The Realist Criteria – Were they met? 
This part of the analysis will go through the main actors actions and measure 
them with the criteria listed in the description of the hypothesis, based on the 
presentation of realism in chapter 4.2. As realism is an actor based theory, I 
find it natural to structure the analysis in such a manner that I deal with each 
actor according to the theory. The end of this part will sum up my 
considerations up in a brief conclusion, before moving on to the next part, 
which will be the next hypothesis. The hypothesis for this part is:  
 
H1: Article 4 (h) was adapted to accommodate the main actors goals, but will 
not be upheld at the expense of their interests. 
 
6.1.1 South Africa: 
Even though the Mbeki government has stated its commitment to the AU and 
the pan-African vision on several occasions (e.g. Mbeki, Feb 3. 2003, Mbeki, 
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Sept. 16 2004), this does not give reason to believe that the government does 
not calculate its decisions and moves strategically with its own interests in 
mind. Though realists believe that the world is anarchy and the strongest state 
will prevail, it also sees the value of positioning in accordance with the 
environment if one is not in the position of hegemony. As chapter 5 has shown 
the Mbeki government adjusted its strategy towards its neighbors. This was a 
strategic move. Not only did South Africa gain a political calm where there had 
been rattling, but it also managed to persuade the African community that it 
would use its position as a regional giant to invest in the continent and 
contribute to peace and development (Schraeder 2001:230). “[I]t is objectively 
in the interest of all Africans to encourage the realization of these goals 
throughout our Continent, at the same time as we pursue their attainment in 
each of our countries” (Mbeki, Oct. 11. 1999). It is not difficult to take South 
Africa’s change in foreign policy in account for a rational actor argument. The 
first liberal strategy was not well received by its neighbors. The Zimbabwean 
initiative to isolate South Africa in the SADC clearly shows that South Africa 
was conceived as a regional threat. To keep the solo strategy would have been 
difficult. Mbeki also realized that with unstable neighbors it would be difficult 
to maintain a profile as a serious business partner for foreign investors. A long-
term plan to stabilize Africa and especially the region around South Africa may 
therefore have seemed like a good idea for the state.  
 
The investments put in to this was not necessarily solely intended to be of good 
will or idealism. It also provided South Africa with a good opportunity to gain 
a reputation as an international actor with diplomatic capabilities and ambitions 
to be counted on by the international community. Such a reputation is worth a 
great deal in future prospects of investments in the state, but also opens up for 
possibilities of great influence in other areas. The noted interest in a permanent 
seat in the UNSC in one such occasion. Even though South Africa must have 
expected that a large part of the economic burden would lay with them, there 
was still a potential of greater outcome to be expected in the future. There 
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should therefore be reason to believe that South Africa acted as a unitary 
rational actor when it decided that it would play an active role in expanding the 
continental organization. There are, however, in the mind of a realist, other 
benefits from this behavior that supports the hypothesis. Settling the dispute 
with its neighbors would give South Africa the peace it wanted in the region. 
This strongly supports the motivation of security. Although South Africa may 
never actually have been at the verge of war with its neighbors it is important 
to remain friendly with its closest in a security dilemma. No one wants an 
enemy brewing next door. In a clever move South Africa has maintained its 
position as a regional giant, positioned it self central in the continental 
organization an at the same time abstain from criticizing and thus making 
enemies inside the region. It has made it a non-conflict situation, as far as such 
is possible. Though all of this seems to be in perfect order, a strategic vision to 
life, it is almost as Article 4 (h) fits in as a fail-safe in South Africa’s plan. 
Through exhibiting the state in a diplomatic, pro-development, democratic 
light, it should have nothing to fear by “giving up” sovereignty. There is little 
or no risk for the South African government to surrender the right to deny the 
AU free entry in to domestic affairs. Not in Africa where “South Africa is 
without question the leading power on the […] continent”(Schraeder 2001: 
230), and not while South Africa prevails as one of the stabile and profitable 
states (ibid). 
 
6.1.2 Nigeria: 
These strategic considerations are not inconspicuous when we look at the other 
actors from the same perspective. Nigeria had for a long time been bleeding 
financially through their support in their neighboring states (Doyle 1999). This 
was a tense issue in the domestic arena and change was imperative for 
Obasanjo in order to claim both legitimacy and sincerity as he had made this a 
strong argument in the electoral campaign (ibid). This is perhaps the first area 
where it seems almost obvious from a realist point of view to want Article 4 
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(h). The long standing battle from Obasanjo to get recognition for his project of 
the CSSDCA shows that he had realized that West Africa’s need for external 
influence or aid to stabilize it self was important. The great Nigerian initiatives 
through ECOWAS and ECOMOG are further confirmation of Nigeria’s 
commitment to regional stability (Bøås & Dokken 2002: 101). The motivation 
for this initiative was highly motivated by security. Bøås & Dokken (ibid) 
claim that the background for the ECOMOG initiative in Liberia was motivated 
by the Nigerian governments desire to keep the Liberian president Samuel Doe 
in power. Nigeria wanted to keep Doe in power as a regional ally and also 
because this would put the Liberian government in Nigeria’s debt (ibid). Even 
though this failed it serves as an example of how interstate cooperation could 
have realist motives. ECOMOG has been dominated by Nigeria, with the 
supreme commander being Nigerian from 1990 until at least 2002(Bøåa & 
Dokken 2002:102). That this had direct consequences for Nigeria, at least in 
the eyes of Obasanjo, becomes evident through his explicit campaign statement 
that Nigeria could no longer spend substantial means carrying the peace project 
of its neighbors (Tieku 2004:259).  
 
This fact also goes in to account for the point of wealth that is central to 
realists. Where Obasanjo claims that Nigerian money should be used in the best 
interest of the Nigerian people (Doyle 1999), he speaks right in to the heart of 
the realists. This is also exactly where the change in interventionism comes in. 
With a strong mandate to intervene in states the AU has the opportunity to 
actively participate in the development of peace and democracy in Africa. To 
the state of Nigeria, that need not worry any more about peace and democracy 
in their neighborhood outside the fact that it will make the region more stabile 
and thus increase their security (Bøås & Dokken 2002:103), this is a golden 
chance to lay the responsibility of keeping stability over to the AU. This will 
have to be a long-term perspective, as the AU is not well funded, but it is not 
difficult to see how a rational unitary actor will calculate this to be a profitable 
investment. As the CSSDCA was a Nigerian initiative and was made a part of 
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the Constitutive Act, this provides Nigeria with international and, more 
important, continental credibility (Tieku 2004:262). Nigeria, as one of the 
initiators, can thus expect to be a party to be recognized and included in major 
decision-making processes. This is influence and influence increases power. 
The Nigerian rational to ratify Article 4 (h) can thus easily be summed up as 
one states quest to increase security, power and wealth. Realism has no 
problems explaining this event. 
 
6.1.3 Libya: 
Muammar al-Ghaddafi has been searching for reliable allies for a long time, 
during which he has made some impressive u-turns, re-building bridges some 
would have expected to be burned and long gone (Huliaras 2001:10-11). 
Considering Libya as a rouge state has not been a controversial statement in the 
past (BBC 2001). With sanctions from the UN and the USA, Libya has been 
looking around to make friends with its enemy’s enemies. Proposing marriage 
to the Arab world demanded a cold shoulder to “Black Africa”, but when this 
turned out to be a failure Ghaddafi made a 180° turn and opened his arms to the 
African identity again (Huliaras 2001: 5).  
To claim these shifts in alliances to be strategic is hardly a bold statement. As 
chapter 5 describes, the Libyan foreign policy has been dominated by a wish to 
increase power and security. When the African leaders showed will to ignore 
the international sanctions imposed on Libya, the state was not reluctant to turn 
over its stated ideology and kinship with the Arab community, and welcome 
the African support. Ghaddafi even “pronounced that the ‘Arab world is 
finished’ and declared Africans and not Arabs as Libya’s real supporters” 
(Huliaras 2001:11). Libya even went as far as suggesting the idea of the United 
States of Africa, which was a plan consisting of far more than surrendering of 
sovereignty rights (Tieku 2004:261). Though the stated goal of this plan was 
indeed to help Africa rise and claim its position in the world, it is not easy to 
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ignore the obvious advantages that lay in the suggestion for Libya. With 
Ghaddafi’s hopes of becoming the president of this federation that would give 
him control of a joined force and a common foreign politics, he would indeed 
have found him self a solid ground to stand on and a much more powerful 
place from which to be firm and unafraid of the international community. In 
doing so he would have gained a relative increase in the state’s power, security 
and wealth. Though this ambitious plan did not get to see the light of day, 
Ghaddafi still had a good strategic reason to commit himself to the African 
continental politics (ibid: 262). After the African leaders had proven 
commitment to Libya as an African state by ignoring the international flight 
prohibition, Libya had every interest in grooming its allies (Huliaras 2001:13).  
 
Though little evidence suggest that article 4 (h) was a goal in it self in the 
Libyan plan to make Africa more integrated with Libya, it should be seen as a 
bi-product and at that one that did not go by unnoticed. Libya must have fully 
expected something like article 4 (h) when it joined the lobbying for a reformed 
continental organization. Though the United States of Africa had a much more 
committing and severe consequence for the sovereignty of the African states, 
the Libyan leader was expecting to be the leader of this federation. 
Disappointment and skepticism of surrendering sovereignty without expanding 
power is evident by the proposed and ratified amendment to the Act (Tieku 
2004: 262-263). By amending the phrase “threat to legitimate order” Muammar 
Ghaddafi could have made a loophole for governments in somewhat exposed 
positions. The theory that the Libyan government had no intention in allowing 
the AU to intervene uninvited to intrude in domestic business in Libya does 
seem to be strengthened. Of course the actual effect of the amendment is not 
really interesting in relation to the hypothesis. But what is interesting is that it 
inserts a theoretic possibility for the states governments to make certain 
reservations in what they will allow from the public and feel legitimate to strike 
down upon without risking that the AU intervenes. Or rather, it gives the state 
leaders, who are the people’s representatives in the AU a theoretic possibility 
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to cooperate to ensure that the “legitimate order” in states is never threatened. 
It would seem plausible to claim that Libya’s goals, though not fully 
accommodated, were represented through the creation of Article 4 (h) and its 
amendments.  
 
6.1.4 Summary – the realist hypothesis: 
So, was the article created to accommodate the main actors? Looking at their 
behavior and their intentions leads us to believe that this is so. That the three 
main actors in the initiative to reform the OAU initiated processes that, though 
they may not have had a specific idea that that was how the document would 
look in the end, led to this significant change in interstate politics in Africa, 
seems to be a statement it is easy to get behind. The main criterion of realisms 
view of states behavior seems to have been met by every actor. All three states 
have specific rational reasons for making the commitment to the new AU 
stronger and they all behave strategic. What need to be mentioned, however is 
that not all of the actors met their goals. In fact Ghaddafi does not seem to be 
much better of, with the exception of having tied his allies closer to him. From 
a realist point of view this may even seem as a Phyrric victory. Though the 
initial motivation can be credited to a realist train of thought, the strategy was a 
very risky one if the main goal was not to tie the state closer to the African 
Union. Sovereignty is a very expensive price to pay. It is not necessarily a 
relative increase in power for Libya. On the other hand, Libya was not the 
strongest party in the negotiations. The Southern and Westerns “giants” both 
represented greater powers. In this respect realists would be right in their claim 
that the stronger states prevail. “The most powerful states in the system create 
and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or 
even increase it”(Mearsheimer 1995:13). However, since realists does not have 
great faith in the influence of institutions, but see them as “an intervening 
variable”(ibid), states is not expected to follow the resolutions of an institution 
if it does not suit the state at the moment. Such an argument further increases 
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the explanation force of the realist hypothesis. H1 is thus a highly plausible 
explanation for the decision of ratifying Article 4 (h). 
 
6.2 The Liberal Institutionalist Explanans  
In this part of the analysis I will proceed with analyzing the actions of the main 
actors, only this time through the oculars of liberal institutionalism. I will, as in 
the previous part, focus on the presented theory above and the criteria in 
relation to H2. Since the previous part focused on the actors and was structured 
accordingly, I find it more useful to structure this part differently in order to 
enhance the differences between the two theories, although they are both actor-
based theories. In doing so I believe that the analysis gains quality, both for the 
reader, but more importantly it becomes clearer why these two hypotheses does 
not rest on the same presumptions. The hypothesis for this part is:  
 
H2: The main actors found enough common ground, goals and interests that 
they introduced a policy of intervention.  
 
6.2.1 Searching for common ground 
Article 4 (h) represents a major leap of faith. It is, as discussed earlier, actually 
asking of each state that ratifies it to surrender one of the most basic concepts 
that constitute a modern state: the sovereign right to rule within domestic 
boundaries. In order for states to make this commitment there should be some 
reward at the end of the road. When the three major actors behind the initiative 
to reform the OAU launched their initiatives each of them had ideas that 
implied further integration. The African Renaissance, the CSSDCA and the 
United States of Africa were projects that urged to greater integration with the 
argument that it would benefit all to work together. Obasanjo’s long time 
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struggle to get the importance of cooperation on security and development 
through to the leaders of the OAU clearly states that he believes in cooperation. 
That it also benefits Nigeria does not belittle the possibility that the wish to 
cooperate is a sincere one. It is actually something that can easily be used as an 
argument to support this theory. To promote an idea on the grounds that it will 
benefit one self as much as the next does not necessarily take away credibility 
from the project. Some might even say that it adds honesty to the argument. 
Nigeria has also, through many years of inserting money and means in to 
efforts to stabilize its neighbors in domestic disturbances, showed a will and a 
desire to join in a common project (Bøås & Dokken 2002: 101). However the 
motivation for this, as discussed above, Nigeria has been taking initiative in 
organizing and working in institutions.  
 
When president Mbeki of South Africa reintroduced the African Renaissance-
project, he aimed at continuing the work of earlier pan-Africanist movement. 
This project is a ‘holistic vision … aimed at promoting peace, prosperity, 
democracy, sustainable development, progressive leadership and good 
governance’ (Tieku 2004:255). The rhetoric is thus not so different from that of 
the CSSDCA. That the South African government and the Nigerian 
government had some goals in common seems clear. They also both seem to be 
interested in cooperating in order to achieve this. As is mentioned earlier, 
South Africa’s rise from apartheid and back in to international politics was 
conceived, by some, as a potential threat (Sturman 2004:3). The alienation that 
the liberal economic line, but also the criticizing of undemocratic governments, 
created in relation to the other African states did not seem to be a popular idea 
(Tieku 2004:254). To improve bilateral interests with its immediate neighbors, 
a shift was needed. It was, however, important to maintain and develop an 
interest for foreign investors, thus it would be important to look serious and 
stabile, also with concern to the immediate environment. In other words it is a 
good incentive to contribute to the development and stabilization of other 
African states. South Africa would also be a natural candidate for a significant 
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role in the AU. As a regional economic giant to be reckoned with the state 
could be pretty sure that it would not just be one vote in a lot of others 
(Schraeder 2001: 230). There was thus little to fear for South Africa when 
committing to the article, that such power would be abused to its disadvantage. 
In fact the pay-offs may have seemed to be greater from the possibilities of 
cooperating than from those of maintaining the status quo.  
 
Libya had god reasons to commit to the African community as well. The 
Libyan experience of African leaders allegiance was that it was first and 
foremost African. Though Libya had been trying to approach an Arab 
community, but after failed attempts to get the other Arab states to oppose the 
sanctions from the USA had given up, Africa was prepared to welcome the 
state back and showed it. Libya answered by turning around and embracing 
“Black Africa”. Ghaddafi called for Africa to unite and stet that "It is time to 
unite the African continent and work for development" (Arabic News 1999). 
There is no question about whether Ghaddafi had been searching for allies for 
some time. That he seized this opportunity and made attempts to make it as 
solid as possible is therefore not surprising. With his proposals for a joint 
foreign policy and one “single ‘African Army’ with a single joint command 
staff to secure peace and stability, avert the outbreak of any internal armed 
dispute and to safeguard the sovereignty, security and safety of the 
Union”(Cilliers 2003), it seems obvious that there were common ground. Libya 
would want somewhere strong to depend on and to lean on. In such matters 
Libya should be eager in making the AU as strong as possible.  
 
6.2.2 Protecting interests while abandoning sovereignty? 
Though the states in no way are dissolving their formal sovereignty, it is a big 
step in the direction of abandoning power over how one is governing a state. 
The only state leader of the three that seems to be clearly concerned about this 
is Libya. The amendment to the Act that was proposed by Libya and ratified by 
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the AU is very different from the remaining text of the original Article 4 (h). It 
draws attention from the obvious intention of protecting the citizens from 
atrocities either from its own government or where the national government 
fails to provide such protection. The amendment focuses on the event of a 
hostile takeover of a state or a coup d’état. This is not to say that it demolishes 
the force of the article, or takes the theoretical capability out of the AU, but it 
does prepare the AU to potentially intervene on the government’s side in a 
conflict. With the bad reputation the OAU suffered under as a “dictators’ club”, 
one has to wonder what kind of decision the AU would make in the event of a 
democratic movement making a stand against an autocratic ruler (Francis 
2006:28). Though democratic progress is an explicit goal for the AU, internal 
unions between state leaders may come to weigh heavy in the event of a 
potential intervention. In the relation to specifically protecting their interests, 
Libya seems to be the only state that is explicitly concerned with this.  
 
This does however not mean that South Africa and Nigeria is oblivious to the 
fact that they are allowing a larger authority to command the destiny of their 
borders sanctity. As mentioned above they have great benefits to expect from 
this. “The move to create the AU was not initiated only by Mbeki; the very 
idea of the AU is at the core of the attempts of South Africa’s ruling African 
National Congress (ANC) to improve the image of Africa in order to attract 
foreign investment and make the new South Africa an important global trading 
nation”(Tieku 2004:253). In other words: South Africa is protecting its own 
interests in the very creation of the union. Protecting their own interests may be 
exactly what they are doing, only within the forms of the organization. 
 
Nigeria has for many years participated in regional security politics (Bøås & 
Dokken2002: 101-105). The desire to contribute to peace in its neighboring 
states may have sprung from a self-enhancing motivation (ibid: 101). 
Nevertheless Nigeria has been taking regional responsibility and Obasanjo has 
personally been involved in the development of the CSSDCA (Tieku 2004: 
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258). This initiative calls on African leaders to redefine of the concept of 
security to involve “both a human security issue and as an interdependent 
phenomenon” (ibid: 256).  On the human security issue the CSSDCA states 
that ‘[t]he concept of security must embrace all aspects of society ...[and that 
the] security of a nation must be based on the security of the life of the 
individual citizens to live in peace and to satisfy basic needs’, while “[a]s an 
interdependent phenomenon, it urged African leaders to see the security of 
their states ‘as inseparably linked to that of other African 
countries’”(Ibid.:256). That Obasanjo was committed to cooperation as the best 
possible means to this end seems obvious. Bearing in mind that Nigeria was 
effectively spending 1 million US dollars a day on the peacekeeping mission of 
ECOMOG in Sierra Leone (Ibid: 259), puts great incentives for Nigeria’s state 
interests to divide this burden. Nigeria has some experience with regional 
cooperation for its own wellbeing (Bøås & Dokken 2002:101). This might not 
be any different. 
 
6.2.3 Summary – the liberal institutionalist hypothesis 
This theory offers some interesting perspectives to the analysis that realism 
holds as unlikely. H2 suggest that the main actors actually has a sincere wish to 
cooperate and to create an organization that will work effectively, such that 
their interests is best fulfilled. This seems evident in the actions of Obasanjo 
and Mbeki. They both had opted for a more including and committing 
cooperation and both for their own reasons. In short; South Africa wanted the 
AU to be stronger in order to stabilize the continent and thus induce investors 
to engage in commerce with the African states; The African Renaissance, while 
Nigeria needed help with peacekeeping missions in their region and wanted 
cooperation on development and security: the CSSDCA. To both these states, 
these expected benefits were great in value. Where this argument would not 
hold in a realist paradigm, it stands firm within the realm of liberal 
institutionalism, because of the emphasis on absolute gains. Where realists 
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would claim that an actual commitment to a continental organization with 
autonomy to intervene would be impossible in a security dilemma, liberal 
institutionalists may respond that the security dilemma is of minor importance 
just because of the continental organization with autonomy to intervene. The 
article in question makes the security dilemma a minor issue, if there is trust in 
the organization. Libya may not be gaining anything by this article per se. The 
plan of a United States of Africa proved to grandiose for the General 
Assembly. Nevertheless it stands little to lose and everything to gain from 
strengthening its alliances. If the AU grows strong and Libya is on board as a 
major actor, that increases Libya’s power in the world. And Libya is on board 
as one of the major actors. In terms of absolute gains, it seems as though all the 
main actors has reason to expect an increase. We have also seen that all of the 
three main actors had incentives for increased cooperation and that this 
correlated with the goal of enhancing the states own interests. If such is the 
case, then H2 makes a strong case of explaining the research question. 
 
6.3 The Constructivists – are they just semantic 
truoblemakers? 
The theory in this part of the analysis is a structure based theory and this part 
will be structured as such. The emphasis is whether or not the criteria pointed 
out in the discussion of the hypothesis are met and, as with the two previous 
parts a brief summary and conclusion will follow at the end. The hypothesis for 
this part is:  
 
H3: The AU was socialized by a general international trend to abandon its 
hard and fast line of non-intervention.  
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6.3.1 A trend in the world 
That there has been a trend towards re-defining the importance of sovereign 
borders internationally is illustrated in chapter 5. The UN has, though not 
removing its articles on the sovereign rights of states in its charter ratified 
several resolutions of interventions in different states for humanitarian 
purposes. Humanitarian intervention has become a phrase in international 
politics and the criteria for such has been developed and expanded on occasion 
depending on the situation and its demands (Evans & Sahnoun 2001:2). That 
Africa should follow this trend should not be unnatural. Though state 
sovereignty in Africa has a somewhat different origin than the rest of the 
world, and especially the western world, the trend that has been established is 
highly relevant for the continent. The willingness to do so however demands a 
greater political leap in Africa in general than in for instance Europe. As I 
establish earlier in this paper the state sovereignty in Africa serves a different 
purpose in addition to the usual one that one might be more accustomed to 
when dealing with traditional nation-states. It has been an important instrument 
in stabilizing the state system on the continent, and not so much as a prevention 
of invasion from outside hostility and protection of self-determination. To 
commit to a trend that has not been established formally in any document 
would be a radical move, perhaps even more so because the norm of state 
sovereignty has been so strong in the OAU. But why has the norm been so 
strong in Africa? It has not been this papers mission to reveal the reasons for 
the quick adaptation of the established state system the western powers left 
behind, but is this not also learning of sorts? It would seem that the African 
state system of non-intervention and rigid focus on state sovereignty has been 
an inheritance of the colonists. Though the reasons for keeping the system may 
have been for stabilizing interstate relations, opportunistic despotic leaders 
want for power or merely for practical administration, the system was not an 
African invention. To a continent that has been built up on states without 
nationality, the pan-African plan may be a good alternative, as good as any: 
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The trend in the world being a guiding arrow to point the way. Chapter 5.5 
describes a trend in the world that challenges the traditional way of looking at 
state sovereignty. The African Union has made an unprecedented resolution to 
allow an interstate organization to have autonomous powers of intervention. 
 
6.3.2 The trend becomes the norm 
That the main actors of the creation of the AU have been behaving in 
accordance to the aforementioned trend is as difficult to deny, as it is to verify. 
Nigeria has been involved in peacekeeping missions and been greatly 
concerned with cooperation and development beyond its borders for some time, 
especially through ECOWAS/ECOMOG. The motivation for this may be 
security, power, wealth or all of it. It is difficult to say, as actions can be taken 
into account for different motivations easily. There is no problem stating that 
the Nigerian plan of intervening with its neighbor’s politics has been to ease 
things domestically. That this is something a realist would do. However it 
might as well be for benign reasons to help people in need. It may be both. 
Acting on a notion of shared understandings does not automatically imply 
being ethically good intended (Finnemore 1996:6). Aiding an unstable state 
with armed forces and money is nevertheless within the trend of intervention. 
Though there is not an international resolution behind it, the means of aid is 
within the same concept. To actively help a country that struggles internally 
without yielding to the concept of state sovereignty. If the state’s motivation is 
not its relative power measured with other states or the security situation 
around its own borders, but rather something else, like humanitarianism, then 
the trend described in Chapter 5 is actively socializing states in position to act. 
If this is the case, then the Nigerian effort in the neighbor states, the struggle to 
get recognition for the CSSDCA and the reform of the AU is all a socializing 
process that states derive their preferences from. It goes further with the South 
African initiative to bring not just the southern African region or its own state 
in to the international community but the entire continent with the pan-African 
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plan. The desire to raise Africa as a continent, to “re-invent the African state to 
play its effective and rightful role on the global terrain” (Tieku 2004: 255) 
shows a will that goes beyond a state-centric frame of mind.  
The complete turnover would be Libya that has had an absolute state-centric 
way of thought and now is ready to commit fully to the AU and the idea of 
cooperation for the common good before anything.  
 
6.3.3 Active teachers or self-taught states 
The signs of Africa behaving in a manner that is in accordance with the rest of 
the world is not absent. The question remains: Is there a “teacher” in this 
situation? This question is not easy to answer. An obvious place to look would 
be the UN. The before mentioned resolutions could be seen as a norm-giving 
initiative of sorts, though it does not imply that other organizations take this 
upon them self to enforce. In fact the UN record of upholding the force behind 
words of promise in situations such as these is blemished with some ugly 
failures over the years. The situations of Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia 
“occurred at a time when there were heightened expectations for effective 
collective action [and] have had a profound effect on how the problem of 
intervention is viewed, analyzed and characterized” (Evans &Sahnoun 2001:1). 
These four situations were all different situations where the UN for different 
reasons failed either to make a decision on how to act, or failed to answer to the 
tasks they had set forward to do. As it is put in the “Responsibility to Protect”-
report: “It raises the principle that intervention amounts to a promise to people 
in need: a promise cruelly betrayed”(ibid: 1). This could point in the direction 
of not a “teacher” situation, but rather a “learning” process. “To the extent [the] 
states are taught, they are self-taught”(Finnemore 1996:12). This means that 
unlike the expectations in the theory presented by Finnemore, the “problem” is 
not identified by an active teacher, but the “solution” is suggested in the before 
mentioned trend and the state leaders that came together to create the AU 
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“learned” from it. What they then might have learned from cases such as 
Somalia and Rwanda, where the UN involvement have been less successful or 
a complete failure, is that “for all the rhetoric about the universality of human 
rights, some human lives end up mattering a great deal less to the international 
community than others (Evans &Sahnoun 2001:1). This may have been part of 
a reason for African decision makers to give authority to act on such incidents 
to an all-African organ: An African solution to an African problem (Fomunyoh 
2005). Though such initiatives as the ECOMOG had had various degrees of 
success in the past (Human Rights Watch 1993 & 2003), there is no necessity 
in this pathology being inherited to the next. If this stands, then the active 
teacher that Finnemore describes in her cases is non-existent in this case. The 
implication of which will be a weakening of the claim that the AU was 
“taught” the necessity of a policy of non-intervention. The claim that the AU 
was socialized however seems to fit regardless of the teaching/learning 
difference.  
 
6.3.4 Summary – the Constructivist hypothesis 
It cannot be completely falsified that the actions of the decision makers of the 
states in the AU could be the result of learning that seems to stem of this 
growing trend in the international society. Neither can it be completely 
verified. It is evident that Article 4 (h) of the Constitutional Act represent a 
change in inter state policy for the African state leaders. That their interests 
have changed seems to be confirmed by this fact. As the theory claims and as is 
also specified in chapter 4, there are certain things to look for in order to 
determine whether H3 should be given any significance in explaining this 
phenomenon. The first, and perhaps the most important one is the fundamental 
difference from the two other theories employed here: That states can alter 
their interests based on how commonly shared norms and values change in the 
international society. The empirics seem to support the claim that such a 
change of norms and values indeed has taken place. Chapter 5.5 describes a 
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world where the concept of state sovereignty is clearly under review. As we 
have seen through this paper, this concept has been especially strong on the 
African continent and in fact embedded by ratification in the former continental 
organization; the OAU. The norm of humanitarian intervention is now 
mandated the AU through the Constitutional Act and it is difficult to ignore the 
arguments of Martha Finnemore’s constructivism that will have us believe that 
this is interconnected with the rest of the international community’s efforts in 
the same direction. That the AU has in fact made a decision that is historical 
not only in Africa, but is unprecedented in history does however point in the 
direction of learning rather than teaching. Finnemore’s theory that states 
change their interests and thus behavior on the account of specific influence 
from outside actors does not therefore seem to have won any additional 
validation through this analysis. But then again, that was never the intention of 
this thesis. What the theory does seem to have done however is to provide a 
very sensible point from where to look at the case of analysis in this thesis. 
Though the “teaching” seems to be unlikely as an explanation here, H3 does 
not seem to be much falsified as a valid explanation. The change in norms and 
values seems well documented and the states consequential change in interests 
seems plausible as a result. Though we may never know the exact intentions of 
the decision makers involved and their possible ulterior motives, H3 has 
proved a useful and powerful explanation. 
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7. Conclusion  
As the thesis aspires, so it delivers a case study of the decision in the 
Constitutional Act of the African Union that allow the organization to make an 
autonomous intervention in any of its member states: Article 4 (h). The thesis 
has described how the political environment around the decision makers were 
prior to this decision, it has shown what motivations they may have had and it 
has described what historical background the African states had on the subject 
of state sovereignty. Thus far the thesis has been a case study that has collected 
and presented the vital information to describe, and to some extent understand 
how Article 4 (h) could be included in the Constitutional Act. The thesis has 
proceeded with a presentation of tools that has enabled a theoretical analysis of 
the case. To this analysis the thesis has included an additional ambition: To test 
to what extent these tools, the IR theories, can account for the creation of 
Article 4 (h). Both the ambition to explain why Article 4 (h) was created and 
the ambition to test the theories explanatory value on the case have been 
satisfied in chapter 6. That is to say: the analysis for both ambitions has been 
made through chapter 6, what remain to do is to conclude. That will be the 
ambition of this chapter. To fulfill the two ambitions presented in the first 
chapter of the thesis, this chapter will go through the findings and the 
preliminary conclusions in chapter 6 and answer the research questions with 
conclusions as far as it is possible. 
 
7.1 Why is the African Union breaking with its hard 
and fast line of non-intervention? 
The means to answer this question has been through the criterion of the three 
IR theories applied to the thesis. Chapter 6 has systematically gone through the 
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applicability of the three different hypotheses, and made considerations to 
whether they are strengthened or weakened. What this has shown is that each 
hypothesis is able to give a reasonable explanation for why Article 4 (h) was 
created. The hypotheses are all plausible as explanations. Their differences do 
however force them to put significance to certain parts of the information, 
whilst other information is attached lesser significance. This is an 
epistemological difference that does little to describe the significance of what 
information is presented. This is also the reason why it is impossible to falsify 
any of the hypotheses. The analysis is thus unable to determine an exact answer 
to the first research question. Instead it answers it three different times, with 
three different answers. All three theories have proven capable of giving some 
credible explanation to the question. Though the data does not equally support 
all explanations.  
 
The realist hypothesis (H1) is strongly supported from the outset by the fact 
that three state leaders with different agendas can be identified as main actors 
in the process. This supports the premises in realism that presupposes that 
states are the actors in an anarchical world and that they act based on rational 
strategic decisions (Mearsheimer 1995: 10). That one such decision is to equip 
a continental organization of which they are members with an authorization to 
intervene in any member state, does however, not seem to be in concert with 
the realist rationale of the competitiveness that inhibits the nature of anarchy. 
To surrender sovereignty to an international organization would presume that 
their commitment is not truthful or that the actors recognize some immediate 
advantage to joining the organization (ibid: 13). There is little evidence that 
legitimize a presumption such as this. Then again, there typically would not be.  
 
The hypothesis that would be able to account for this is the liberal 
institutionalist (H2). This theoretical framework recognize the anarchical state 
the states find themselves in and agree with the realists when they suggest that 
states are operating in their own self-interest. However, the criterions for the 
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hypothesis show that H2 expect states to cooperate if this increases that self-
interest. The evidence for this is much more conspicuous as the three state 
leaders all have their own projects that corresponds with cooperation in the 
AU. Mbeki presents the African Renaissance, Obasanjo the CSSDCA and 
Ghaddafi, though seemingly in an “ad hoc” fashion, the United States of 
Africa. Chapter 5 describes how these initiatives presented great incentives for 
the state leaders to strive for a more efficient and thoroughly integrated 
cooperation. That the creation of Article 4 (h) should increase both the absolute 
gains and the states individual interests seems plausible through this. For H1, 
however, this seems to be a weakening point. 
 
None of the two hypothesis do, however, pay much attention to the 
development of political environment that chapter 5 describes under 5.5. They 
do both operate under the assumptions that states are sensitive to other states 
behavior, but the “trend” that is described in chapter 5 must be said to consist 
of more than that. The constructivist hypothesis H3 focuses mainly on this as a 
determining factor to explain how states define their interests (Finnemore 
1996: 2). This hypothesis is not necessarily contradictory to the previous one. It 
could also be complementary. Though the premises for the theories are widely 
different, the explanations are not mutually exclusive.  
 
It may be tempting to suggest that Article 4 (h) was created because “The main 
actors found enough common ground, goals and interests that they introduced 
a policy of intervention”(H2), and “ The AU was socialized by a general 
international trend to abandon its hard and fast line of non-intervention.”(H3). 
Based on the findings of this thesis this is the most covering explanation. To be 
sensitive to other states could be fair enough reason to want to adapt a closer 
relationship to other states, but security does not seem a plausible argument to 
enter a cooperation that entails weakening of the states sovereignty. And as this 
is “the most significant difference between the AU and its predecessor the 
OAU” (Sturman 2004: 1), that has to be included in any “instrumentally 
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rational” considerations (Mearsheimer 1995: 10). This leads naturally to the 
second ambition of the thesis: to test to what extent these three IR theories can 
account for the creation of Article 4 (h).  
7.2 IR theory’s ability to account for Article 4 (h) 
The second ambition of the thesis is to find what extent IR theory can account 
for the creation of Article 4 (h). This is a critical question for two important 
reasons in this thesis. Firstly, this article represents a policy that is 
unprecedented in history. It is therefore timely to ask whether or not IR theory 
is equipped to explain this measure in interstate relations. Secondly, as the 
previous section indicates, the creation of Article 4 (h) has more than one 
plausible explanation.  
 
Dunn & Shaw (2001: 27) argues that no traditional IR theory is adequate for 
Africa. The argument throughout their book is based around the argument that 
state-centric IR theories cannot explain or predict African state behavior, as 
“historically, African political systems were based pluralistic nations, not 
homogenous states” (ibid). I have argued earlier in this thesis that since the 
case investigated in the thesis is not one that presumes democratic processes in 
the states involved, nor is concerned with the cultural or political applicability 
of the Westpahlian state system on the African continent, but rather is a 
political decision between state leaders, this critique does not apply to this 
analysis. The question of whether or not IR theory can account for the creation 
of Article 4 (h) in this case study should therefore not be concerned with this 
problem, and will not be further discussed to this respect.  
 
Nevertheless, the political implications of Article 4 (h) are of such a nature that 
the IR-theories that have been presented in this thesis do not directly address 
them. None of the above-mentioned theories expect the possibility of a state 
voluntarily agreeing to transfer the right to command its sovereignty to occur. 
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The two actor based theories would certainly stifle at the idea that their units of 
analysis fades out one of their more defining traits. There is no argument 
within the realist framework that would condone the surrendering of 
sovereignty. Neither would liberal institutionalism, though prone to 
cooperation and focused on “explaining why economic and environmental 
cooperation among states are more likely than realists recognize” 
(Mearsheimer 1995:14). To make the cooperation as committing as to allow 
the AU intervene autonomously does not seem likely. The most probable angle 
from where these theories would aim to explain this type of behavior would be 
if one state were planning to cheat the others. In such a case realism would 
make a strong argument and an informal explanation. This would supply the 
realist argument that institutions only are constructed based on states 
calculations of self-interests in the international balance of power (ibid: 13). In 
the case investigated here, however, this is not possible to control for. It would 
thus be an unintelligible assumption without any root in the empirical findings. 
No meaningful discussion would do this.  
 
The remaining theory, constructivism, does include a theoretical possibility of 
accounting for such a policy implementation as Article 4 (h). It depends on 
how far an analyst is willing to extend the argument that states define their 
interests in the context of  “internationally held norms of what is good and 
appropriate”(Finnemore 1996: 2). It would be possible to argue that this is a 
feasible result of the socializing of states interests. The theory is contesting the 
basic presumption of the two other theories: that preferences are unproblematic 
and that the source of state preferences is located within the state (ibid: 7). This 
theory might thus be the only of the three that is prepared to account for a 
sincere surrendering of sovereignty to an international organization. The 
problem of assessing this is that the explanatory potential rests with each 
analyst’s subjective belief in the theory’s criteria. Another problem is that this 
analysis falls under the criticism of using the theory with the states as analytical 
units (Bøås & Dokken 2002: 37). The advantage with this has been that it has 
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been possible to include several actors in the analysis of how they were 
influenced by the abovementioned trend. The disadvantage has proven to be 
that some of the theory’s potential has been sacrificed to do so. 
7.3 Final Remarks 
The conclusion this far has been ambivalent and perhaps more ambiguous than 
concrete. This stems from the nature of the findings in the case. The stark 
reality is that in order to explain the creation of Article 4 (h) in the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union one needs applicable analytical tools, and the tools 
applied in this thesis do not provide a definite answer. As previously 
mentioned, it is impossible to falsify any of the hypotheses completely, and it 
would not be fair to do so. All of the presented hypotheses have explanatory 
potential. Nevertheless, I have argued that they all end up wanting.  
 
That the African Union has commenced in an unprecedented co operational 
project has already been established. Nowhere has any international 
organization formalized authority such as the right to intervene as the African 
Union has, through Article 4 (h) (Baimu & Sturman 2003: 40). Hence, 
explaining an event of this magnitude has not been of any concern to any IR 
theory. Through this thesis three different, well-formulated and feasible 
theories have been applied to explain this phenomenon. As this conclusion, 
based on the previous analysis, show none of the hypotheses appear to provide 
a sufficient explanation. This does not imply that the theories are insufficient, 
but rather that some other variables that are not included in the case are in play. 
Bøås and Dokken (2002: 14) note that the “most important unit of analysis in 
the [international] system is the sovereign state” and practically every conflict 
in Africa “transcends borders and have consequences far beyond a single 
state”. This indicates that there might be more to the criticism presented in 
Dunn and Shaw’s book “Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory” 
than first assumed. The case investigated in the thesis contains a reliable set if 
 85
data to analyze to the best of the applied theories assumptions. Even so, the 
hypotheses do not, in this authors view, represent sufficient explanations. It 
may be that internal factors within the African states, which are not accounted 
for in the development of our IR theories, play a role that this case study does 
not capture. “In Africa, the state is yet to reach maturity. Therefore, the realities 
of political, social, cultural, religious and other important connections to 
nations and ethnic group cannot be ignored or dismissed in new African(ist) 
approaches for understanding contemporary African phenomena” (Dunn & 
Shaw 2001: 27). 
 
Though the data in this thesis has been presented as simplistic as possible, I 
have complete faith in the validity and reliability of the case study of this 
thesis. However, my conclusion cannot escape that the findings of the analysis 
point to a lack in explanatory force, and thus fails to satisfy the ambition of the 
first research question to some extent. This indicates that the theories used do 
not account for all the possible variables that may be in play here. Though 
suffice to conduct a meaningful analysis, the information presented may not 
contain these variables. Although the theories might not require, nor be able to 
absorb such variables as mentioned by Dunn and Shaw (ibid) the theoretical 
analysis is complete. The substantial explanation however is rendered lacking, 
as none of the hypotheses provide a credible explanation for any state to 
surrender sovereignty to a continental organization such as the African Union.  
 
This thesis should thus, in conclusion be recognized as further testimony to 
Africa’s vast political complexity and political analysts challenge in explaining 
this satisfactory. Though it has been shown that the theoretic framework that 
exists today is not inadequate, the variables that are rendered untested deserve a 
framework that allows them to be subjects of further inspection. The challenge 
of including complex diversities between analytical units that are not 
necessarily equal is yet to be answered. To thoroughly analyze the 
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international relations of Africa, the challenge is to move the focus away from 
interstate relations. 
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